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IT’S NOT JUST ABOUT MIRANDA:  
DETERMINING THE VOLUNTARINESS OF 
CONFESSIONS IN CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS* 
Paul Marcus† 
In criminal law, confession evidence is a prosecutor’s 
most potent weapon—so potent that . . . “the 
introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a 
trial in court superfluous.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2002 in suburban Maryland, just outside of Washington, D.C., 
murder suspect Richard Gater was arrested and interrogated at the 
police station. The interviewing officer warned Gater “that if he did not 
tell police where to find the gun used in a killing several days earlier, 
heavily armed officers could raid the home of Gater’s ailing mother and 
possibly slam her on the ground and handcuff her as they looked for the 
weapon.”  Seen and heard on videotape, the officer’s final comment 
before Gater confessed was:  “You don’t want to put your family 
through this.”2  
A decade earlier, in Titusville, Florida, murder suspect Brian 
Kennedy was interrogated, and he asked what would happen to him if 
he told the police his story.  The appeals court later stated:  “The 
detective asked Kennedy if he had ever heard of immunity and then 
proceeded to explain immunity to him.  The detective, immediately 
realizing that he had made a mistake by mentioning immunity, informed 
Kennedy that he, as a police officer, could not grant immunity, but that 
the state attorney could.”  Kennedy confessed soon thereafter.3 
                                                 
*  Paul Marcus, 2006. 
†  Haynes Professor of Law.  A portion of this paper was delivered at the Valparaiso 
University School of Law, A Consideration of Miranda:  40 Years, as part of the Seegers 
Distinguished Lecture Series in January, 2005.  With thanks to the students and law 
faculties of St. John’s University, Valparaiso University, the University of Maryland, and 
the College of William and Mary for the many helpful comments made during 
presentations. 
1 Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221 (1997). 
2 Ruben Casteneda, Interrogation Problems Caught on Video in Md., WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 
2003, at B01, available at LEXIS, ALLNWS File. 
3 Kennedy v. State, 641 So. 2d 135, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
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Just last year, a federal circuit court reversed a trial court’s finding of 
an inadmissible confession where the defendant appeared to have been 
promised that he would not be prosecuted if he confessed that his killing 
of the victim was “spontaneous.”4  The majority relied heavily on the 
defendant’s age (mid-fifties), his experience (military veteran, manager 
in a real estate office), and his academic background (college education, 
one year of law school).  In essence, his confession could be viewed as 
voluntary because he is “an educated, sophistical individual . . . [who] 
had past experience and dealings with . . . investigators.”5 
In these cases and in many others, whether the suspects received 
Miranda warnings was really not at issue in connection with the 
admissibility of their incriminating statements.6  In all three of these 
cases, the key question was whether under the circumstances the 
statements had been given voluntarily, consistent with the requirements 
of the Due Process Clause.7  To many readers, this focus on voluntariness 
                                                 
4 United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2004).  The transcript from that portion 
of the interrogation states: 
Lebrun:  So, am I hearing that I won’t be prosecuted? 
I (interrogator):  That’s what you are hearing. 
LeBrun:  Is that what I am hearing? 
I:  That’s what you are hearing. 
I: If it’s . . . spontaneous and that’s the truth, you will not be 
prosecuted. 
I:  That’s absolutely right. 
LeBrun:  I am here to tell you there was no premeditation. 
I:  All right. 
LeBrun:  It was spontaneous 
I:  Okay 
I:  So it was, let me get this clear.  It was spontaneous? 
LeBrun:  Correct. 
Id. at 725. 
5 Id. at 723.  The dissenting judges were vigorous in their disagreement with the 
majority, writing that in addition to making a false promise to the defendant the 
government agents “interrupted Mr. LeBrun in a bullying manner and demonstrated a 
threatening kind of impatience with him.”  Id. at 727. 
6 See generally LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715; Kennedy, 641 So. 2d 135. 
7 Gater’s statement was excluded, with the judge ruling that the government “cannot 
threaten the family members of the defendant, you may not threaten the defendant and 
you can have no coercion, promises or threats.”  Without the incriminating statement, the 
jury acquitted Gater of first degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder.  
The judge strongly chastised the government, for the officer’s conduct constituted a threat 
“directed against the defendant’s loved ones under circumstances in which he is under 
arrest and unable to protect them.”  See Casteneda, supra note 2. 
 Kennedy’s murder conviction was affirmed on appeal, with the majority 
acknowledging that while Kennedy had been “sold a bill of goods” as to immunity, he had 
not been coerced into confessing.  The lone dissent sharply disagreed, stating that 
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in the confession process—apart from Miranda—may come as a surprise.    
The common assumption is often made that, however debatable Miranda 
may be, it has had a definitive impact and has essentially eliminated the 
need to consider the messy and ineffective rules regarding voluntariness 
in the interrogation process that were in play before 1966.8  However, the 
reality of voluntary interrogation is not nearly so simple or concrete. 
The importance of Miranda cannot be misstated.  It has had nothing 
short of a revolutionary impact on the way in which we look at the 
validity of interrogations in individual criminal prosecutions.  While 
Miranda has had a great number of severe critics,9 when it is coupled 
with Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel10 and Fourth Amendment 
Search and Seizure considerations,11 the United States is indeed quite 
                                                                                                             
“Kennedy was induced to confess and even the slightest promise of a bargain is sufficient 
to invalidate a confession.”  641 So. 2d at 140. 
8 Many have written of the major problems in this area prior to Miranda, and several 
thoughtful analysts come to mind.  Lawrence Herman described the matter well: 
It violates due process of law for the prosecution in a criminal case to 
use the defendant’s involuntary confession against him.  Whether a 
confession is involuntary must be determined by considering the 
totality of the circumstances – the characteristics of the defendant and 
the environment and technique of interrogation.  Under the “totality of 
the circumstances” approach, virtually everything is relevant and 
nothing is determinative.  If you place a premium on clarity, this is not 
a good sign.  The point is that the Miranda dissenters in 1966 and the 
Attorney General in 1985 were simply wrong in their claim that we got 
along well with the law that antedated Miranda. 
Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police 
Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 745 (1987).  Catherine Hancock was more succinct:  
“[T]he Court’s Due Process decisions . . . [speak] of ‘coercion’ and the ‘totality’ test as 
though they were unchanging anchors of thought.”  Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before 
Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2237 (1996).  Yale Kamisar has been the foremost 
commentator in the area.  He wrote bluntly of the problem in Confessions, Search and Seizure, 
and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J., 465, 471 (1999) (“The pre-Miranda voluntariness test 
was too mushy, subjective, and unruly to provide suspects with adequate protection.”); see 
also Yale Kamisar, What is an “Involuntary” Confession?, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963). 
9 For an overview of the concerns as to Miranda being too broad or not broad enough, 
see, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 461 (1998); Paul Marcus, A Return to the “Bright Line” Rule of Miranda, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 93 (1993); Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
309 (2003); George C. Thomas, Miranda’s Illusion:  Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation 
Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2003). 
10 Under the counsel provision, police may not engage in questioning of a suspect—even 
one not under arrest or in custody—without notice to the suspect and her attorney.  
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).  However, this deceptively powerful rule 
applies in a relatively few number of cases, for the Sixth Amendment is in force only once 
the defendant has been formally charged.  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
11 A search issue is found when an action by the government that violates the Fourth 
Amendment results in an incriminating statement.  The question then is whether that 
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different from that which existed four decades ago.  The question 
remains whether the voluntariness standard has become essentially 
irrelevant or of minimal importance as a result.12 
This Article seeks to answer several key questions:13  Are the 
voluntariness rules still being broadly litigated?  Do they have weight in 
many major cases, or are they of note simply in fringe areas?  Finally, is 
the law regarding voluntariness any better than it was before Miranda, 
and is there now more certainty for law enforcement personnel, lawyers, 
and judges?  This Article does not seek to extend the earlier, thoughtful 
proposals that had been made as to ways in which more definite 
standards and rules could be used.14  Also, this Article does not seek to 
determine whether current Fifth Amendment law results in serious 
consequences as to innocent parties confessing or the police being 
unduly handicapped in the investigative process.15  Rather, the purpose 
of this Article is to evaluate the law on voluntariness.   To accomplish 
this, I have reviewed every reported state and federal appeals decision 
                                                                                                             
statement is tainted by the earlier illegality.  If so, the statement must by excluded as 
evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Paradis, 351 F.3d 21, 34 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 463–65 (7th Cir. 2003); State v. Maraschiello, 88 S.W.3d 586, 600 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2000); Moss v. State, 75 S.W.3d 132, 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
12 One observer wrote that “[a]lthough Miranda has largely replaced the involuntary 
confession rule, the latter still exists; it was not overruled by Miranda.”  Herman, supra note 
8, at 752.  The Supreme Court, in its tepid reaffirmation of Miranda in Dickerson v. United 
States, discussed the voluntariness principles.  530 U.S. 428 (2000).  The Justices stated that 
the voluntariness test “is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to 
conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.”  For a highly critical view of 
the voluntariness test, see Mark Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule:  Toward 
a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465 (2005). 
13 Juan Carlos Alarcon, Stacy Haney, Virginia Vile, Kristine Wolfe, and Laura Wright all 
provided outstanding research assistance. 
14 The late Professor Welsh White of the University of Pittsburgh Law School laid out a 
number of careful proposals over the past twenty-five years.  See Welsh S. White, 
Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 979 (2003); Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure 
to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001); Welsh S. White, 
What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001 (1998) [hereinafter White, 
What is an Involuntary Confession]; Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 
U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979) [hereinafter White, Police Trickery].  Deception in the questioning 
of suspects has been hotly debated.  See Robert P. Mosteller, Moderating Investigative Lies by 
Disclosure and Documentation, 76 OR. L. REV. 833 (1997); Margaret L. Paris, Lying to Ourselves, 
76 OR. L. REV. 817 (1997); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery:  Investigate Lies 
by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775 (1997); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil:  Police Lying in 
Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425 (1996).  The law regarding deception and voluntariness 
is discussed, infra Part III.A. 
15 Compare the views taken in Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 
112 YALE L.J. 447 (2002), with Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices:  How Far 
is too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168 (2001). 
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on voluntariness of the past twenty years.  Tens of thousands of opinions 
dealing with confessions in criminal cases were examined, a good 
number of which mentioned voluntariness, but they did not truly 
explore the due process principles.16  Ultimately, I have read a few 
thousand opinions on point, dating from 1985 to present.17 
The forthcoming Parts show that the key conclusions can be stated 
concisely.  The voluntariness considerations remain a major matter in 
criminal prosecutions, and the substantive law in this area has not 
improved or become more definite over the past four decades.  To that 
end, the analysis will begin with several major United States Supreme 
Court decisions and then look to the way in which state and federal 
judges continue to construe and apply those decisions.   
II.  THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SPEAKS 
The United States Supreme Court has contemplated issues regarding 
the admissibility of confessions in criminal cases under the voluntariness 
standard numerous times in the modern era.  Most of these cases have 
focused on the application of the basic standard for consideration to 
particular fact patterns.  However, in three opinions the Justices sought 
to give broader guidance.18 
                                                 
16 The problem often focused on whether a Miranda waiver was voluntary.  While this 
point is related to the broad voluntariness issue and is often resolved in similar fashion, it 
involves a distinct and different analysis.  See, e.g., Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584–
85 (5th Cir. 2003); State v. Mortley, 532 N.W.2d 498, 502–03 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). 
17 The substantive state cases numbered well over 1500.   The federal cases were more 
difficult to break out in terms of precise numbers, for the discussions often were bound up 
with habeas corpus procedures, application of Miranda to non-confession issues (such as 
the discovery of later evidence), ineffective assistance of counsel, fruit of the poisonous tree 
applications, etc.  However, it is fair to conclude that there were many hundreds of federal 
decisions discussing voluntariness during this time period.  At the United States Supreme 
Court level, the volume was not high, with much more emphasis being placed on the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment issues in connection with confessions.  Still, over the past twenty 
years, more than a dozen opinions have discussed, at least to a limited extent, 
voluntariness.  Of course, even all of these figures do not fully lay out actual cases in which 
the voluntariness claim is raised.  I only reviewed reported appellate decisions.  Also, cases 
in which the defendant was acquitted, otherwise prevailed at or before trial, or did not 
bring up the question on appeal are not part of this process. 
18 Which is not to suggest that numerous other opinions from the Court were not of 
consequence; they certainly mattered a great deal.  See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda with a notation that it provided greater certainty as a 
standard than did the voluntariness test); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) 
(allowing an involuntary confession into evidence could be viewed as harmless error); 
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (holding that the defense can offer evidence to the 
jury on whether admissible confession was “unworthy of belief”); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 
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A. Bram v. United States19 
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court expressed concern with 
the interrogation process and the Due Process Clause.  In Bram, the Court 
sought “to guard against the inherently coercive atmosphere of a police 
interrogation and its effect on an accused’s exercise of his constitutional 
rights.”20  The following language in Bram was frequently relied upon 
throughout the twentieth Century, especially prior to the 1980s, and it 
still gets quoted on occasion:  “[A] confession, in order to be admissible, 
must be free and voluntary:  that is, it must not be extracted by any sort 
of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, 
however slight.”21 
The greatest reach of this notion would be to take it literally so that 
any degree of inducement would be sufficient to invalidate an otherwise 
permissible statement by the defendant.  Not surprisingly, very few 
courts have ever followed such an interpretation.22  Instead, the modern 
view of the statement is that threats and promises are to be taken 
seriously but that these are rarely determinative on their own.   If such 
evidence is present, the court must view that inducement along with 
other key factors in determining if the resulting statement was given 
                                                                                                             
U.S. 528 (1963) (addressing a situation of undue pressure on a mother where police 
suggested that involvement with her children was at stake in the process); Brown v. 
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (setting forth one of the earliest discussions of voluntariness 
regarding shocking torture and threats against suspect).  Still, while these cases and many 
others remain significant, the three presented in the text appear to have had the greatest 
impact on the widest range of prosecutions throughout the nation. 
19 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
20 Taylor v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998). 
21 168 U.S. at 561. 
22 To be sure, the United States Supreme Court itself has, from time to time, repeated the 
statement from Bram.  See, e.g., Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976).  But see Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).  As explained in People v. Vasila:   
The Attorney General urges us to conclude that . . . officers are 
permitted to induce a confession by making promises, so long as they 
keep them.  This is not the law. . . .  The California Supreme Court has 
never distinguished between promises of leniency based on whether 
the promises were kept.  The issue is not whether a commitment was 
honored, but rather whether governmental agents have coerced a 
citizen to give testimony against himself.  When the government does 
so, it deprives that citizen of a right assured to him by the Fifth 
Amendment.  Whether the coercion is based on a promise kept or 
repudiated can only truly be tested in hindsight, but it constitutes 
coercion under either scenario. 
45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 360–61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).  See generally State v. Osborn, 547 N.W.2d 
139, 145–46 (Neb. 1996).  For a critical view of Bram, see Godsey, supra note 12. 
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voluntarily.23  As explained by one court, the key question is whether the 
inducement is “so attractive as to render a confession involuntary.”24  
Consequently, in most jurisdictions there is no true per se rule banning 
confessions that occur after a promise or threat is made.  Rather, courts 
evaluate the inducement and the other “circumstances surrounding the 
confession [to determine if there are] indicia of voluntariness.”25 
B. Spano v. New York26 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized the 
grave difficulties raised by issues of improper interrogation techniques, 
which arguably result in involuntary confessions in criminal 
prosecutions. The starting point is whether such a confession is “the 
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, made by the 
subject at a time when that person’s will was not overborne.”27  
However, the competing interest that the Court has repeatedly 
emphasized is that confessions are “essential to society’s compelling 
interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the 
law.”28 
The most significant decision by the Supreme Court that clarified the 
importance of balancing these important considerations was written 
almost a half century ago in Spano.29  Vincent Joseph Spano was an 
Italian immigrant convicted of murder in New York.  The Spano decision 
is significant because it explored these two conflicting positions in great 
detail,30 and contrary to other decisions, it did not involve a situation in 
which physical force or the threat of force was present.31 
                                                 
23 See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of the standard.  See generally Marquez v. 
State, 890 P.2d 980, 986 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). 
24 United States v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 254, 261 (6th Cir. 2003). 
25 Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2001).  The Supreme Court has written that the 
“passage from Bram . . . does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a 
confession.”  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991). 
26 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
27 As stated by the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Bowers, 661 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Iowa 
2003). 
28 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986). 
29 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
30 “[W]e are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests of society; its 
interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and its interest in preventing the rights of 
its individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law 
enforcement.”  Id. at 315. 
31 The Supreme Court has never wavered in its view that the use of violence or the 
threat of physical harm will virtually ensure that any resulting confession will be found to 
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As the Court noted, Spano was of foreign descent.  He had no prior 
experience with the criminal justice system.32  A friend of Spano’s, a 
police cadet, pretended to befriend him and then berated him when 
Spano was reluctant to confess.33  The Court stated that Spano had a 
history of emotional instability, that he was held for an extended time, 
and that instead of making a narrative statement, he “was subject to the 
leading questions of a skillful prosecutor in a question and answer 
confession.”34  There was heavy pressure, certainly, but it fell far short of 
the physical force or threat seen in earlier cases.  Recognizing that “the 
actions of police in obtaining confessions have come under scrutiny in a 
long series of cases,”35 the Justices looked to all of these factors and 
decided that the resulting confession was involuntary because Spano’s 
                                                                                                             
be involuntary.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Malinski v. New York, 
324 U.S. 401 (1944).  As written in Stein v. New York: 
[T]here is no need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the 
individual victim.  The tendency of the innocent, as well as the guilty, 
to risk remote results of a false confession rather than suffer immediate 
pain is so strong that judges long ago found it necessary to guard 
against miscarriages of justice by treating any confession made 
concurrently with torture or threat of brutality as too untrustworthy to 
be received as evidence of guilt. 
346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953).  This strong view has been followed throughout the nation.  See, 
e.g., United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1101 (10th Cir. 1996); Cooper v. Scroggy, 845 
F.2d 1385, 1391–92 (6th Cir. 1988); Hinton v. Snyder, 203 F. Supp. 2d 934, 941 (N.D. Ill. 
2002); People v. Woods, 703 N.E.2d 35, 44 (Ill. 1998); Haak v. State, 695 N.E.2d 944, 948 (Ind. 
1998); Zuliani v. State, 903 S.W.2d 812, 820–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Smith, 410 
S.E.2d 269, 272 (W. Va. 1991).  Some courts note that if physical force is used, the officers 
must “back off before interrogating [the suspect].”  United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 
1467 (10th Cir. 1993).  Other courts write that in determining voluntariness “the need for 
. . . an individual calculus is obviated by the egregiousness of the custodian’s conduct.  
Indeed, confessions accompanied by physical violence wrought by the police have been 
considered per se inadmissible.”  United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 While there are certainly opinions allowing for the use of force in the interrogation 
process, they are few in number and tend to be quite limited in scope.  See, e.g., Leon v. 
State, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).  Leon involved officers that twisted the 
suspect’s arm and choked him until he revealed where the victim was being held.  The 
resulting statement was admissible because the purpose of the force was to find the victim, 
not to build the case against the suspect.  Id.  Overwhelmingly, the courts strongly 
condemn any use of coercion, whether or not physical in nature.  Blackburn v. Alabama, 
361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 559 (1954); Chambers v. Florida, 309 
U.S. 227, 237 (1940). 
32 360 U.S. 315, 321–22 (1959). 
33 Leading to the Chief Justice’s remark that the defendant “was apparently unaware of 
John Gay’s famous couplet:  ‘An open foe may prove a curse, But a pretended friend is 
worse.’”  Id. at 323. 
34 Id. at 322. 
35 Id. at 321. 
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“will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy falsely 
aroused.”36 
The language of the Spano Court condemning the law enforcement 
actions is powerful indeed: 
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary 
confessions does not turn alone on their inherent 
untrustworthiness.  It also turns on the deep-rooted 
feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing 
the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much 
endangered from illegal methods used to convict those 
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals 
themselves.37 
C. Colorado v. Connelly38 
If the majority in Spano was highly critical of the government and its 
opinion potentially expansive in scope, both the tone and reach of 
judicial scrutiny was scaled back considerably in Connelly.39  At the 
outset, it is important to note that the harsh language of Chief Justice 
Warren directed against law enforcement in the earlier opinion was 
certainly not present in the statement of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
Connelly.  The Court’s conclusion was that police action in such cases will 
be problematic only if the interrogation, taken as a whole, is “so 
offensive to a civilized system of justice that [it] must be condemned.”40 
However, it is important to note the unusual factual setting in 
Connelly.  In Connelly, the defendant approached a police officer to talk 
about a murder.  Although the officer advised the defendant of his 
Miranda rights, the defendant immediately confessed, and he provided 
details regarding the murder.  These details helped prove a previously 
unsolved murder.  Later, the defendant became disoriented and spoke of 
hearing voices that directed him to confess to the murder.  Initially, the 
defendant was found incompetent to stand trial.   Subsequently, he was 
allowed to stand trial even though a psychiatrist stated that Connelly 
was suffering from schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state the day he 
confessed.  The state courts found that his confession was involuntary 
                                                 
36 Id. at 323. 
37 Id. at 320–21. 
38 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
39 See generally id. 
40 Id. at 163. 
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because it was “not the product of a rational intellect and a free will.”41  
The judges were persuaded that the defendant’s mental illness disrupted 
his ability to make a free and rational choice.42 
At no point in the litigation did anyone allege that the police 
engaged in any coercive tactics directed against Connelly or that the 
officers’ action somehow caused Connelly to confess.43  Moreover, when 
the suspect confessed, the officers were not aware that he was suffering 
from a serious mental disorder, and they did nothing to exploit that 
disorder.44  Thus, the Supreme Court decided that the state court ruling 
of involuntariness was erroneous.  The crucial missing connection was 
any improper action on the part of the government officers:  “Absent 
police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis 
for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of 
due process of law.”45 
The Supreme Court reasoned that the “police overreaching” 
requirement was the central feature of confession cases that it had 
decided for decades.46  Moreover, without such a mandated causal link 
or connection, the majority reasoned that trial judges would face the 
impossible task of making “sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a 
criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any 
coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State.”47 
After Connelly, the causal connection became essential, even in cases 
in which the defendant had been subject to improper police investigatory 
action.48  While some assert that this holding has delicately but 
                                                 
41 702 P.2d 722, 728 (Colo. 1985). 
42 For good discussions of this aspect of the case, see State v. Bravo, 762 P.2d 1318, 1324 
(Ariz. 1988), and Smetana v. State, 991 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 
43 A point well made in White, What is an Involuntary Confession, supra note 14, at 2017. 
44 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165. 
45 Id. at 164. 
46 Id. at 163. 
47 Id. at 167. 
48 Judges have been vigilant in following the Court’s ruling.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the defendant “must demonstrate that 
[the confession] resulted from coercive police conduct and that there was a link between 
the coercive conduct of the police and his confession”); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 
1004 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] confession is only involuntary when ‘the police use coercive 
activity to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will.’”); United States v. 
Montgomery, 14 F.3d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here still must be some showing of 
official coercion.”); People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 212 (Colo. 1998) (“A necessary 
prerequisite to a conclusion of involuntariness is a finding that the police conduct in 
question was coercive.”); State v. Fee, 26 P.3d 40, 47 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]e will 
assess only police conduct causally related to the defendant’s confession.”); Jackson v. 
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powerfully shifted the crucial focus from an individual’s voluntary state 
of mind and behavior to the government’s improper action, this is the 
criteria used overwhelmingly throughout the nation.  As a result, under 
the federal Constitution and most state constitutions, judges cannot 
seriously entertain a claim of involuntariness when considering a 
confession unless there is some evidence of official overreaching that 
actually caused the suspect to incriminate herself.49 
III.  DETERMINING VOLUNTARINESS 
There is currently little debate in the United States today on the 
standard used to determine the admissibility of confessions under the 
Due Process Clause.  All agree that the voluntariness test was, and is 
likely to remain, the test to be used by trial judges.  In applying the 
voluntariness test, several key factors have been emphasized over the 
past few decades.  This Article will next examine those factors in order to 
determine whether the Supreme Court mandate has been faithfully 
followed within our courts.  
A. Deception 
1. The Rule 
This Part is not intended to track the incredibly large number of 
cases in which interrogating officers have successfully used deceit to 
elicit an incriminating statement because other scholars have already 
                                                                                                             
State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1153 (Ind. 2000) (requiring the defendant to allege some “violence, 
threats, promises, or other improper influences”); Martin v. State, 686 A.2d 1130, 1144 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (“[T]he governmental conduct itself, no matter how outrageous, is of 
only indirect legal significance and matters only to the extent that it is determined to have 
been the catalytic agent that effectively produced the confession.”); State v. Sabinash, 574 
N.W.2d 827, 829 (N.D. 1998) (“Coercion, in and of itself, does not invalidate a confession.”); 
McGregor v. State, 885 P.2d 1366, 1378 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (“Even if McGregor was 
insane, his confession is voluntary absent actual police coercion.”); State v. Hoppe, 661 
N.W.2d 407, 415 (Wis. 2003) (“[T]here must be police conduct causally related to the 
confession for the confession to be considered involuntary.”). 
49 Consider the interesting thoughts of Judge Posner in United States v. Rutledge: 
The [voluntariness, free will] formula is not taken seriously.  Connelly 
may have driven the stake through its heart by holding that a 
confession which is not a product of the defendant’s free choice—
maybe he was so crazy, retarded, high on drugs, or intoxicated that he 
did not even know he was being interrogated—is admissible so long as 
whatever it was that destroyed the defendant’s power of choice was 
not police conduct. 
900 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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done that.50  Rather, this Part lays out an array of cases to provide a sense 
of the law that has arguably turned out to be extremely favorable to the 
government.  The sole area of deception that has given judges some 
serious pause—lies about the legal system and the law—will also be 
explored.   
One begins here with a central truth:  Police are permitted to lie to 
suspects during the interrogation.  This view is the basis for all 
discussion in the area.51  “[D]eceit and subterfuge are within the ‘bag of 
tricks’ that police may use in interrogating suspects.”52  “[M]ere trickery 
alone will not necessarily invalidate a confession.”53  Deception is “not 
alone sufficient to render a confession inadmissible.”54  The United States 
Supreme Court has upheld this proposition, and virtually every state has 
supported the Supreme Court’s holding. 55 
Indeed, it is rather stunning to see the enormous number of cases in 
which confessions were held to be valid.  Yet, judges found that 
government officials lied to defendants about significant matters 
resulting in incriminating statements.  Police have lied about matters 
such as the following:  witnesses against the defendant,56 earlier 
statements by a now-deceased victim,57 an accomplice’s willingness to 
testify,58 whether the victim had survived an assault,59 “scientific” 
                                                 
50 For an excellent overview, see Young, supra note 14; see also MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.4 cmt. at 353–58 (1975). 
51 On this point there is hardly a dissenting view.  For two courts that have expressed 
concern, see United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[M]isrepresenting a 
piece of the evidence . . . [is] reprehensible.”), and State v. Register, 476 S.E.2d 153, 158 (S.C. 
1996) (“The misrepresentation of evidence by police is a deplorable practice.”).  Still, in 
both cases the later confessions were allowed into evidence. 
52 State v. Schumacher, 37 P.3d 6, 13–14 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). 
53 United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004). 
54 People v. McNeil, 711 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).  The court in Sheriff v. 
Bessey explained:  “Cases throughout the country support the general rule that confessions 
obtained through the use of subterfuge are not vitiated so long as the methods used are  
not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement.”  914 P.2d 618, 620 (Nev. 
1996). 
55 The most famous case is likely Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), where a confession 
was allowed even though the police lied in telling the defendant that his partner in the 
crime had already confessed to committing that crime.  See generally White, Police Trickery, 
supra note 14. 
56 United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); Conner v. State, 982 S.W.2d 655 
(Ark. 1998). 
57 Rodriquez v. State, 934 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
58 United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2002); State v. Simons, 944 S.W.2d 165 
(Mo. 1997). 
59 People v. Fordan, 597 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
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evidence available,60 including DNA61 and fingerprint evidence,62 and 
the degree to which the investigating officer identified and sympathized 
with the defendant.63 
For the Supreme Court Justices and judges throughout the nation, no 
matter the nature of the deception, with one major exception, the issue 
relates entirely to whether the lies “tend to produce inherently unreliable 
statements.”64  Or, as another court stated, whether the “police 
misrepresentations . . . [are] sufficiently egregious to overcome a 
defendant’s will so as to render a confession involuntary.”65  This point is 
made even in connection with the awkward use of polygraph 
examinations to elicit an incriminating response. 
The awkward situations involving polygraph examinations normally 
involve government officers—seemingly independent of the police 
department itself—administering a “scientific” test, and then confronting 
the suspect with the supposed results of the test.  One might consider 
telling a suspect that she has lied to be coercive.66  Yet, the vast majority 
of courts that have reviewed this technique have allowed it, with most 
noting that while the technique should be viewed as a factor “in 
determining whether there was impermissible coercion,” it is not 
inherently coercive by itself.67  This judgment is made even when the 
operator of the equipment advises the defendant that the machine is 
“infallible”68 or engages in “moral urging” to assure a confession.69 
                                                 
60 State v. Bays, 716 N.E.2d 1126 (Ohio 1999). 
61 Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 944 (Fla. 2003). 
62 Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998); State v. Davila, 908 P.2d 581 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1995). 
63 Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (dealing with a situation 
where the officer “misled appellant into believing [officer] was a pedophile”). 
64 Sheriff v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 622 (Nev. 1996). 
65 State v. Buntin, 51 P.3d 37, 42 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); see also State v. Welker, 932 P.2d 
928, 931 (Idaho 1997). 
66 A few courts have held that the resulting confessions violate due process.  See 
Martinez v. State, 545 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he polygraphist exerted 
improper influence over Martinez by emphasizing that both the polygraph results and the 
state’s witnesses would contradict his story, and by telling him that he was going to wind 
up in a problem.”); State v. Craig, 864 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Mont. 1993) (“We . . . condemn the 
use of the results of polygraph examinations to elicit or coerce a confession from 
defendants.”). 
67 Smith v. State, 797 So. 2d 503, 525 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (quotation marks omitted); 
see also United States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003); People v. Cipriano, 
429 N.W.2d 781, 795 (Mich. 1988); People v. Cannady, 663 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1997). 
68 People v. Henson, 692 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
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2. Physical Evidence 
Some judges, while affirming the ability of the police to lie during 
the interrogation process, have resisted allowing the government to 
falsify physical evidence such as reports and videotapes.  In State v. 
Cayward,70 the leading case in this area, the police fabricated two 
scientific reports, including one from a DNA lab.  Most recently, a New 
Jersey court struck down a confession when the police made an 
audiotape in which an officer posed as an eyewitness and appeared to 
give information in the interview that incriminated the defendant.71  
Courts have viewed physical evidence as simply different from, and 
more coercive in nature than, lies during a conversation.72  As stated by 
the court in Cayward: 
We think . . . that both the suspect’s and the public’s 
expectations concerning the built-in adversariness of 
police interrogations do not encompass the notion that 
the police will knowingly fabricate tangible 
documentation or physical evidence against an 
individual. . . .  [T]he manufacturing of false documents 
by police officials offends our traditional notions of due 
process. . . .  [M]anufactured documents have the 
                                                                                                             
69 Gomes v. State, 9 S.W.3d 373, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).  Other police practices can 
be especially telling, particularly when the court views them as having a cumulative impact 
on the suspect.  See, e.g., State v. Grey, 907 P.2d 951 (Mont. 1995) (regarding lies about 
which people police would be interviewing, the extent of the theft problem, the value of 
property taken, and the use of a video camera).  Generally, though, the multiple practices 
situation will be viewed as part of a “totality of circumstances” analysis.  See infra Part IV. 
70 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
71 State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003).  In reality, the situation was 
more complicated.  Here the tape was used to induce the confession, and it was also offered 
at trial to establish the context of the confession and demonstrate that it was voluntarily 
given.  Id. 
72 One court stated: 
Understanding that law enforcement needs some latitude in fighting 
crime, this court should permit police to use verbal deception but 
prohibit their use of falsehoods or deception in written or other 
tangible form, such as falsified lab tests, witness statements, or 
doctored photographs.  This strikes an appropriate balance between 
the necessity for the police to use some deception in developing 
evidence, while prohibiting the carrying of such deception or 
falsehoods to a truly unfair advantage over an accused. 
Sheriff v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 622 (Nev. 1996) (Rose, J., dissenting). 
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potential of indefinite life and the facial appearance of 
authenticity.73 
Still, many courts are reluctant to establish such a “bright-line test 
dictating that verbal lying in interrogation is allowed, but fabrication of 
documents is forbidden.”74  For these courts, the question remains:  With 
the falsified documents, is this considered action that would “have 
induced a false confession”?75 
3. Deceptions About the Legal Process 
Understandably, courts historically have been concerned about 
officers lying to the suspect about the legal process during interrogation.  
If one were to accept such behavior, real concerns surface about 
sabotaging of the entire system.  This appears to be the view of the 
Supreme Court in Lynumn v. Illinois.76  In Lynumn, the officers 
misrepresented to the suspect several times that if she did not confess, 
government benefits would be withdrawn and the suspect might not be 
able to see her children.  The suspect subsequently confessed; however, 
she later challenged the voluntariness finding made by the trial court:   
“The only reason I had for admitting it to the police was 
the hope of saving myself from going to jail and being 
taken away from my children. The statement I made to 
the police after they promised that they would intercede 
for me, the statements admitting the crime, were 
                                                 
73 Cayward, 552 So. 2d at 974.  In  State v. Farley,  the court stated: 
We do not believe that merely telling the defendant that he did not do 
well on a polygraph examination without further elaboration is likely 
to encourage an innocent person to confess. Had the police 
intentionally fabricated more specific false results to obtain a 
confession, our view may very well be different. This is particularly 
true if the police had reduced these fabrications to a written report and 
disclosed it to the defendant. We definitely draw a demarcating line 
between police deception generally, which does not render a 
confession involuntary per se, and the manufacturing of false 
documents by the police which “has no place in our criminal justice 
system.” 
452 S.E.2d 50, 60 n.13 (W. Va. 1994). 
74 Bessey, 914 P.2d at 622. 
75 Id.  In Whittington v. State, the court stated:  “We reject [defendant’s] contention that 
police deception with regard to the use of bogus scientific procedures is inherently more 
coercive than other forms of deception.”  809 A.2d 721, 734 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); see 
also State v. Von Dohlen, 471 S.E.2d 689 (S.C. 1996); Arthur v. Commonwealth, 480 S.E.2d 
749 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). 
76 372 U.S. 528 (1963). 
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false. . . .  My statement to the police officers that I sold 
the marijuana to Zeno was false. I lied to the police at 
that time. I lied because the police told me they were 
going to send me to jail for 10 years and take my 
children, and I would never see them again; so I agreed 
to say whatever they wanted me to say.”77 
The Court’s language was succinct but direct:  “We think it clear that 
a confession made under such circumstances must be deemed not 
voluntary, but coerced. That is the teaching of our cases.”78 
Cases such as Lynumn have led some courts to attempt to develop a 
bright line rule concerning deceptions about the legal process during 
interrogation.  The leading opinion is by the Hawaii Supreme Court, 
which distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic falsehoods to 
demonstrate permissible action by the government:79 
[E]mployment by the police of deliberate falsehoods 
intrinsic to the facts of the alleged offense in question 
will be treated as one of the totality of circumstances 
surrounding the confession or statement to be 
considered in assessing its voluntariness; on the other 
hand, deliberate falsehoods extrinsic to the facts of the 
alleged offense, which are of a type reasonably likely to 
procure an untrue statement or to influence the accused 
to make a confession regardless of guilt, will be 
regarded as coercive per se, thus obviating the need for a 
“totality of circumstances” analysis of voluntariness.80 
Examples of potentially permissible intrinsic falsehoods normally 
focus on the evidence assembled against the suspect, while 
impermissible extrinsic falsehoods typically look to the assurance of 
more favorable treatment or the consequences of a particular conviction 
or admission.81 
The harshest judicial language is usually found in cases in which 
police officers tell suspects that if they confess they will be released 
                                                 
77 Id. at 532. 
78 Id. at 534. 
79 State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 73 (Haw. 1993); see also Cole v. State, 923 P.2d 820, 830 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1996). 
80 As explained in Sheriff v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 620 (Nev. 1996) (quoting Kelekolio, 849 
P.2d at 73). 
81 United States v. Salisbury, 966 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (N.D. Ala. 1997). 
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immediately or very soon.  This situation often arises when the officer 
says that the interview is for informational purposes only and the police 
are not pursuing a criminal suspect,82 that if criminal action is found 
there would be no prosecution,83 that the statement would actually 
benefit the individual,84 or that the defendant would be released 
regardless of what was said.85  Many cases also consider the statement 
made by officers that if the defendant were to confess she would be 
treated with more sympathy by the trial judge, who would possibly give 
her a lesser sentence.86 
Judges also may be persuaded by the defense in cases in which 
government officials lie about the crime with which the person will be 
charged.  Normally, this is seen where the officer indicates—sometimes 
explicitly, often implicitly—that the crime at issue is not nearly as serious 
as it might appear to the suspect.  Two cases clearly illustrate this point. 
First, in State v. Ritter,87 the defendant made a statement after being 
informed by police that the victim of his assault was still alive, actually 
recovering, “and suffering from nothing more than a bad headache.”88  
Second, just before he confessed, the defendant in Mitchell v. State89 was 
told that the victim had died of a heart attack.90  The courts in both cases 
condemned the interrogation deceptions and found the resulting 
                                                 
82 Smith v. State, 787 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990). 
83 See, e.g., Albritton v. State, 769 So. 2d 438, 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“[P]romise 
. . . that if [defendant] confessed that she committed the offense as part of a religious ritual, 
she would be constitutionally protected and could not be prosecuted.”). 
84 Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188, 194 (Ga. 1988) (citations omitted) (“An accused must be 
warned that anything he says can and will be used against him in court.  Telling him that a 
confession is not going to hurt and, on the contrary, will benefit him as much as the police, 
is not consistent with the warnings required by Miranda.”). 
85 Johnson v. State, 721 So. 2d 650, 659 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).  The converse is seen in 
State v. Edwards, 338 S.E.2d 126, 127 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), where the defendant’s employer 
was ready to post bond to insure his timely release; the officers told him that if he did not 
make a signed statement he could not get out of jail.  See infra text accompanying notes 125–
33. 
86 See, e.g., State v. Burgess, 329 S.E.2d 856, 857 (W. Va. 1985). 
87 485 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. 1997). 
88 Id. at 495. 
89 508 So. 2d 1196 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). 
90 Id. at 1199.  The court stated: 
Officer Turner, who had known the appellant for a long time, testified 
at the suppression hearing that he specifically told the appellant “that 
the woman died of heart failure and that anything that had been done 
to this lady didn’t kill her and she wouldn’t have died unless her heart 
quit.” 
Id. at 1199 (citations omitted). 
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confessions involuntary, for in each case the defendant had been given 
“an implied promise that [he] could not be charged with murder if he 
gave a statement to the police.”91   
The most difficult cases in this area involve deceptions by the 
government about the legal process, but these are lies that are not 
necessarily central to the prosecution against the defendant.  That is, the 
police do not deceive the defendant about going to jail, being charged, or 
being convicted of a more serious crime.  Instead, these falsehoods 
concern the supposedly limited, “confidential” use of confessions,92 
which court would have jurisdiction over the defendant,93 or the role of 
defense counsel in negotiating a fair result for the defendant.94  However, 
even in these cases it should be noted that this principle tends not to be a 
per se rule.  Rather, these deceptions are viewed as factors in the totality 
of circumstances/voluntariness analysis, often resulting in decisions that 
the incriminating statements were voluntarily made.95 
4. Judicial Tolerance for Police Lying96 
Judges certainly seem ambivalent about the use of deception in the 
interrogation process.  There is little judicial encouragement of the 
practice; indeed, there is a fair amount of comment about the distasteful 
nature of lying.97  However, surprisingly few cases in this area involve 
determinations that such lying invalidates resulting confessions, either as 
a per se matter or as applied in the totality of circumstances test.  This is 
                                                 
91 Mitchell, 508 So. 2d at 1199; State v. Ritter, 485 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. 1997). 
92 See Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584–85 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v. State, 65 P.3d 
903, 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003); State v. McConkie, 755 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Me. 2000).  
Deceptions as to the process for the defendant communicating may lead to a different 
outcome.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Novo, 812 N.E.2d 1169 (Mass. 2004).  In this case, 
police told the defendant that if he did not confess at the interrogation session, the jurors in 
this trial could not later hear his explanation.  The court found that the lie resulted in an 
involuntary confession.  Id. 
93 State v. Quintero, 480 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 1992). 
94 United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1991). 
95 See, e.g., United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 723 (8th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. State, 660 
So. 2d 637, 642 (Fla. 1995) (deciding a case where the defendant assumed that statements 
during polygraph examination could not be used against him); Pinckney v. State, 576 
S.E.2d 574, 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the police statement, “you’re not in any 
danger at this point”); State v. Todd, 549 S.E.2d 821, 823 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (considering 
the deception that the defendant might be released if he confessed).  See generally State v. 
Swanigan, 106 P.3d 39 (Kan. 2005). 
96 This sub-title is taken from the thoughtful article by Professor Deborah Young, 
Unnecessary Evil:  Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 451 (1996). 
97 Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 794 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) 
(citations omitted) (disapproving of the use of such deception as a tactical device). 
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true even in those cases where courts attempt to distance themselves 
from what they believe to be utterly inappropriate government 
behavior.98  In short, the deception normally will not be determinative 
with the voluntariness test; rather, it will be one factor in the totality of 
circumstances to be considered by the courts.99  Sadly, that means there 
is little reliable precedent.  Virtually every case is very fact specific, 
which has led some commentators—but not judges—to call for a bright 
line rule that would simply eliminate deceptions during 
interrogations.100 
B. Threats 
With nary a dissent, judges throughout the United States condemn 
threats by police officers made during the interrogation process.  Indeed, 
the language seen in judicial opinions ranges from utter abhorrence101 to 
extreme skepticism.102  One can certainly locate a wealth of decisions that 
find confessions resulting from threats to be involuntary and thus 
inadmissible.103  Even with a very brief look, one sees such decisions 
based on a variety of threats:  physical harm directed against the 
defendant;104 potential prosecution or arrest of friends and family;105 
                                                 
98 As in DiGiambattista, where the conviction was affirmed with the confession found to 
be voluntary, in spite of the language quoted above in a case in which the police misled 
“the defendant into believing the Commonwealth had evidence [phony video tape] against 
him it did not have.” Id. at 1232; see also State v. Critt, 554 N.W.2d 93, 95–96 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1996) (quoting State v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. 1995)).  However, the court 
there did repeat the advice that “police that . . . proceed on thin ice and at their own risk 
when they use deception of the sort used in this case.”  Id.  But see State v. Dalzell, a recent 
North Carolina murder prosecution where the “[p]olice used a phony arrest warrant and a 
fake letter from the district attorney, saying he would seek the death penalty if Dalzell did 
not confess to the crime.”  Judge Throws Out Confession in Carboro Murder Case, WRAL.com, 
Jan. 10, 2005, www.wral.com/print/4066340/detail.html.  Calling the actions an “extreme 
deviation,” the trial court ordered the resulting confession suppressed.  Id. 
99 For a good analysis of the test focusing not only on the police lies but on the 
individual characteristics of the defendant, see Ex parte Hill, 557 So. 2d 838, 841 (Ala. 1989) 
(providing that deception coupled with the defendant’s borderline mental retardation and 
schizophrenic personality caused the confession to be viewed as involuntary). 
100 See Young, supra note 14, at 477; White, Police Trickery, supra note 14, at 628–29. 
101 “A confession is not admissible if it is obtained by any sort of threat or violence, 
however slight.”  Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Kaplan, J., 
dissenting). 
102 “[T]hreat-induced confessions must now be considered ‘presumptively involuntary.’”  
Beavers v. State, 998 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Alaska 2000) (Bryner, Eastaugh, JJ., dissenting). 
103 See infra Part III.B. 
104 The United States Supreme Court, of course, has consistently spoken strongly as to 
force used, or threatened to be used, in order to elicit an incriminating response.  See 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287–88 (1991).  The rule applies whether the force is to 
be used by the police, or by others, such as jail inmates.  Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1540, 
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greater terms of incarceration;106 lack of protection against others who 
threaten the suspect;107 use, or refusal to authorize use, of medical 
treatment;108 loss of employment or education;109 and forfeiture of 
drivers’ licenses.110 
Still, it is an overwhelming reality that even with threats—including 
some rather extreme ones—confessions are routinely found to be made 
voluntarily, and thus they are admissible.  With few exceptions, courts 
do not establish any sort of per se inadmissibility rules, and generally the 
threat is evaluated in context.111  Thus, it is stated:  “[I]t is not enough to 
show that threats were made to induce a confession.  It must also be 
shown in the totality of circumstances that the suspect’s will was 
overborne and that the overreaching police conduct was causally related 
to the confession.”112 
                                                                                                             
1543 (10th Cir. 1993).  The officer in Griffin allegedly told the suspect that if he did not 
confess, he would be placed back in the general jail population and “‘they’d come down 
and smash [plaintiff’s] guts all over the floor like [defendant] had seen before.’”  Id.  See 
generally Lam v. Kelchner, 304 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2002); Zuliani v. State, 903 S.W.2d 812, 823 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 
105 State v. Baker, 521 S.E.2d 24, 26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Keene, 539 N.Y.S.2d 214 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989); State v. Corns, 426 S.E.2d 324, 327 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Black v. State, 
820 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo. 1991).  A few courts take a different view, concluding that such 
threats are permissible if “the threat could have been lawfully executed.  Whether the 
police could have lawfully arrested (defendant’s sister) in turn depends on whether the 
investigating officers had probable cause to suspect (the sister) of criminal involvement.”  
United States v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 254, 262 (6th Cir. 2003); see Turner v. State, 682 N.E.2d 
491, 494 (Ind. 1997)  (holding that this is true even if the defendant is told that he might face 
a capital sentence); State v. Chapman, 605 A.2d 1055, 1061 (N.H. 1992) (holding that this is 
also true even if the defendant is told he “could go to jail for a long time”).  See generally 
United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1078–79 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Thomas, 595 A.2d 980, 981 (D.C. 1991); State v. Massey, 535 So. 2d 1135, 1141 (La. Ct. App. 
1988); State v. Hunn, 821 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
106 This can be found with extended incarceration time, revocation of bond or probation 
status, imposition of a high bond requirement, or delayed release from custody.  United 
States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 305 (4th Cir. 2005); State v. Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577, 585 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Colo. 1992); People v. 
McIntyre, 789 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Colo. 1990); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28–29 (S.D. 2002). 
107 State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 334 (Minn. 1991); State v. Foster, 729 P.2d 599, 604 
(Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
108 State v. Wright, 587 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); State v. Phelps, 456 N.W.2d 
290, 294 (Neb. 1990). 
109 State v. Chavarria, 33 P.3d 922, 927 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Bowe, 881 P.2d 538, 
547 (Haw. 1994). 
110 Webb v. State, 756 P.2d 293, 296 (Alaska 1988). 
111 See State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 35 (S.D. 2002). 
112 Id.  As stated in United States v. Braxton: 
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This showing is difficult to make.113 Confessions have been found to 
be voluntary even with stark threats such as the following:  a refusal to 
offer protection though a credible danger of violence existed,114 a 
statement that the police will arrest the defendant’s wife,115 a threat to 
incarcerate the suspect for an extended period of time,116 a threat to 
possibly cause harm to the defendant,117 or a comment about removing a 
child from the defendant’s family.118 
C. Promises 
As noted earlier,119 most judges in the United States have rejected the 
early pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court on the impact 
of promises during interrogation.120  The Court in the Bram case wrote 
that a confession could not be allowed if it resulted from “any direct or 
implied promises, however slight. . . .”121  Once the Supreme Court itself 
retreated from this broad view,122 courts throughout the country looked 
at promises made, but not necessarily as disqualifying factors.  Rather, 
they were to be taken as matters to be evaluated in the totality of 
circumstances.123  Most judges decided that “[p]romises of leniency, in 
                                                                                                             
The mere existence of threats, violence, implied promises, improper 
influence, or other coercive police activity, however, does not 
automatically render a confession involuntary. . . .  To determine 
whether a defendant’s will has been overborne or his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired, courts must consider “the ‘totality of 
the circumstances,’ including the characteristics of the defendant, the 
setting of the interview, and the details of the interrogation.” 
112 F.3d 777, 780–81 (4th Cir. 1997); see also State v. Swanigan, 106 P.3d 39, 44 (Kan. 2005). 
113 However, this is not impossible, as in Tuttle, where the other circumstances allowed 
for a finding of coercion.  There the defendant was in a cell, interrogated in the middle of 
the night, under the influence of alcohol, only eighteen years old, deceived about the 
evidence against him, and threatened with harsh (though not explicitly described) 
treatment by the government.  Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d at 35. 
114 State v. Sanders, 13 P.3d 460, 466 (N.M. 2000). 
115 State v. Schumacher, 37 P.3d 6, 13 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). 
116 Braxton,  112 F.3d at 785–86. 
117 State v. Bays, 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1137 (Ohio 1999).  The decision in Bays is rather 
striking, for the officers there also misled the defendant as to the strength of the evidence 
against him, and the defendant showed that he had a very low I.Q.  Id. at 1137. 
118 Compare State v. P.Z., 703 A.2d 901, 915–16 (N.J. 1997) (emphasizing that a statement 
was made not during a usual criminal justice interrogation, as in Lynumn, but during a 
child abuse investigation),  with People v. Medina, 25 P.3d 1216 (Colo. 2001). 
119  See supra text accompanying notes 19–25. 
120 For a good discussion of the basic point, see United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 109–11 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
121 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897). 
122 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 (1991). 
123 See generally United States v. Brave Heart, 397 F.3d 1035, 1041 (8th Cir. 2005) (“‘[A] 
promise . . . “does not render a confession involuntary per se.”’  It is simply one factor to be 
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and of themselves, do not necessarily render a confession 
involuntary.”124  While there are some dissenters from this view, there 
are not many.125 
To have a confession declared involuntary purely because of a 
government promise is an uncommon occurrence.  Apart from the merits 
of the claim, courts will not consider applying the standard test unless 
the defendant can demonstrate a causal link between the promise and 
the confession.  That is, she must show that she acted in reliance on the 
promise126 and that she was “induced” to confess as a result of the 
promise.127  Except in the most extraordinary of cases,128 if the promise 
was kept, most courts appear to find the analysis at an end.129  Thus, 
                                                                                                             
considered in the totality of circumstances.”); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“[T]he existence of a promise in connection with a confession does not render a confession 
per se involuntary.”); United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1028 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is clear 
that the voluntariness of a confession does not depend solely upon whether it was made in 
response to promises.”); Bays, 716 N.E.2d at 1137 (“A promise of leniency, while relevant to 
the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, does not require that the confession be 
automatically suppressed.”). 
124 State v. Luke, 1 P.3d 795, 799 (Idaho 2000); see also State v. Durost, 497 A.2d 134, 137 
(Me. 1985).  This is the position taken by one prominent observer as well. Welsh S. White, 
Miranda’s Illusion:  Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1119 
(2003). 
125 See Ex parte Williams, 780 So. 2d 673, 676 (Ala. 2000) (“[A]ny hope engendered or 
encouraged that the prisoner’s case will be lightened . . . if he will confess . . . is enough to 
exclude the confession.”); State v. Jennett, 574 N.W.2d 361, 368 (Iowa App. 1997) (Sackett, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“For a statement to be considered free and 
voluntary, it must not be obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight.”); 
Harper v. State, 722 So. 2d 1267, 1273 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (“[L]aw enforcement officers 
should refrain from giving such an impression, [of favor if defendant confesses], ‘however 
slight.’”).  Also, refer to the Official Code of Georgia:  “To make a confession admissible, it 
must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope 
of benefit or remotest fear of injury. . . .  [But] [t]he fact that a confession has been made 
under a spiritual exhortation, a promise of secrecy, or a promise of collateral benefit shall 
not exclude it.”  GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-3-50, -51 (2005). 
126 State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869, 879 (Ariz. 1997). 
127 Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 
128 Of course, if a promise is made to the accused and not kept by the government, any 
resulting confession is more likely to be struck down.  See Pyles v. State, 947 S.W.2d 754, 
755–56 (Ark. 1997); Satter v. Solem, 458 N.W.2d 762, 769 (S.D. 1990). 
129 See Conner v. State, 982 S.W.2d 655, 663 (Ark. 1998) (“[A] statement should be 
suppressed only if the promise of leniency or reward was false.  Here, the State honored 
the detective’s promise to ‘save Conner’s life’ by waiving the death penalty.  There was no 
detrimental reliance.”); see also State v. Thomas, 673 N.W.2d 897, 906–07 (Neb. 2004); 
Harrison v. Commonwealth, 349 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).  As stated in United 
States v. Rutledge:  “Government is not forbidden to ‘buy’ information with honest promises 
of consideration.”  900 F.2d 1127, 1130 (7th Cir. 1990).  But see State v. Leonard, 605 So. 2d 
697, 700 (La. Ct. App. 1992). 
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there are many cases in which confessions are found to be voluntary 
based upon a variety of promises made, including vague guarantees that 
the defendant will receive better treatment if she confesses,130 offers of 
more lenient punishment for the suspect,131 assurances of lesser charges 
being prosecuted if the individual confesses,132 and the receipt of medical 
treatment if she makes an incriminating statement.133 
The reader ought not to be misled here.  There is little clarity in this 
area.  To be sure, a number of cases are readily identifiable in which 
confessions based upon promises have been held to be involuntary.  
Such cases have led to considerable confusion as to the law and the 
application of constitutional principles, especially when they often come 
from the very same courts, which—in other prosecutions, as noted 
above—allowed the same or very similar promises to induce confessions.  
These cases included agreements not to charge or to bring lesser counts if 
a statement was made,134 promises of leniency for friends or family 
                                                                                                             
[T]here is no authority for the proposition that an induced statement is 
made voluntary and admissible by the fulfillment of the inducement.  
The proper inquiry is not whether the inducement has or has not been 
fulfilled, rather it is whether the statements made by the interrogating 
officer constitute such an inducement that the statements made are not 
voluntary. 
Id. 
130 The court in Rutledge stated the principle forcefully:  “The police are allowed to play 
on a suspect’s ignorance, his anxieties, his fears, and his uncertainties; they just are not 
allowed to magnify those fears, uncertainties, and so forth to the point where rational 
decision becomes impossible.”  Rutledge, 900 F.2d at 1130.  See generally United States v. 
Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 202–03 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1086 
(7th Cir. 2004); McLeod v. State, 718 So. 2d 727, 729–30 (Ala. 1998); State v. Blakeley, 65 P.3d 
77, 84 (Ariz. 2003); Evans v. State, 545 S.E.2d 641, 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Bone, 550 
S.E.2d 482, 490 (N.C. 2001); State v. Beland, 645 A.2d 79, 81 (N.H. 1994); State v. Johnson, 
765 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). 
131 See United States v. Otters, 197 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1999); Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 
635, 645–46 (7th Cir. 1996); Knight v. State, 971 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998); People 
v. Wickham, 53 P.3d 691 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Wilson, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1995).  But see State v. Ray, 531 S.E.2d 705, 707 (Ga. 2000) (applying state statutory 
requirements, as discussed above). 
132 See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 768 P.2d 127, 131 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). 
133 State v. McColl, 813 A.2d 107, 122 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (relating to drug treatment); 
Commonwealth v. Felice, 693 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (addressing psychiatric 
help); People v. Pugh, 607 N.Y.S.2d 761–62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (pertaining to 
psychological assistance); State v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107, 112 (Minn. 1990) (discussing 
psychiatric care); People v. Taber, 495 N.Y.S.2d 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (analyzing 
medical help). 
134 Williams v. Withrow, 944 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rogers, 906 
F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1990); Prince v. State, 584 So. 2d 889, 892 (Ala. Crim. Ct. App. 1991); 
Miller v. State, 18 P.3d 696, 700 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); State v. Tamerius, 449 N.W.2d 535, 
537 (Neb. 1989); People v. Hilliard, 499 N.Y.S.2d 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); State v. Pickar, 
Marcus: It's Not Just About Miranda:  Determining the Voluntariness of Co
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
624 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
members once a confession was given,135 assurances of protection from 
threats of others as soon as the suspect spoke,136 guarantees of treatment 
if the defendant cooperated,137 exchange of lighter sentences for formal 
declarations by the individual,138 and representations by the government 
that if a statement was made it would somehow remain confidential.139 
D. Duration of Interrogation 
The timing of the confession, both as to when it occurs140 and how 
long the process takes, is a perfect example of how little certainty exists 
within the due process analysis.  The extreme situations, of course, are 
not difficult to identify and categorize.  The leading decision comes from 
the United States Supreme Court and is now over sixty years old.  In 
Ashcraft v. Tennessee,141 the defendant was held for thirty-six hours and 
cut off from all contact with others.  Teams of investigators drilled the 
defendant with questions.  During this period, the defendant went with 
virtually no break, which included no sleep or rest.  The Justices had no 
trouble deciding that the resulting confession was coerced and could not 
be used as evidence against him.  The language of Justice Black is 
striking: 
                                                                                                             
453 N.W.2d 783, 787 (N.D. 1990); Robinson v. State, 855 S.W.2d 107, 108–09 (Tex. App. 
1993). 
135 State v. Harper, 485 So. 2d 224, 227 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Lowry v. State, 729 P.2d 511, 
513 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); Tovar v. State, 709 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. App. 1986). 
136 Winder v. State, 765 A.2d 97, 121 (Md. 2001). 
137 State v. Phillips, 30 S.W.3d 372, 375–76 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). 
138 State v. Hankerson, 604 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. 
Distefano, 782 A.2d 574, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). 
139 United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1027 (3d Cir. 1993); State v. Sheehan, 515 So. 2d 
670, 674 (La. Ct. App. 1987); State v. McDermott, 554 A.2d 1302, 1305 (N.H. 1989); State v. 
Pillar, 820 A.2d 1, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); State v. Allen, 432 S.E.2d 199, 202 (W. 
Va. 1993). 
140 This refers to the timing problem in which the authorities delay in taking the suspect 
to appear before a judicial officer, not necessarily the extended period for the interrogation. 
With the former, very specific rules govern the procedure so that the due process analysis 
does not often surface.  In the federal courts, the Supreme Court’s holdings in McNabb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), prompted 
Congress to adopt a statutory provision that gives officers a “six-hour ‘safe harbor’” to 
question the suspect before being required to bring him to a judicial officer.  United States 
v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 660 (7th Cir. 2002); see 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (2000).  A delay of 
longer than the six-hour period allows—but does not require—a resulting confession to be 
deemed inadmissible.  Many states have similar requirements.  See, e.g., Williams v. State, 
825 A.2d 1078, 1095 (Md. 2003) (“We hold that any deliberate and unnecessary delay in 
presenting an accused before a District Court Commissioner, in violation of [the rules] 
must be given very heavy weight in determining whether a resulting confession is 
voluntary.”). 
141 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). 
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Testimony of the officers shows that the reason they 
questioned Ashcraft “in relays” was that they became so 
tired they were compelled to rest. But from 7:00 
Saturday evening until 9:30 Monday morning Ashcraft 
had no rest. One officer did say that he gave the suspect 
a single five minutes respite, but except for this five 
minutes the procedure consisted of one continuous 
stream of questions. . . .  We think a situation such as 
that here shown by uncontradicted evidence is so 
inherently coercive that its very existence is 
irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom by 
a lone suspect against whom its full coercive force is 
brought to bear.  It is inconceivable that any court of 
justice in the land, conducted as our courts are, open to 
the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to 
keep a defendant witness under continuous cross 
examination for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep in 
an effort to extract a “voluntary” confession. Nor can 
we, consistently with Constitutional due process of law, 
hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the 
same thing away from the restraining influences of a 
public trial in an open court room.  The Constitution of 
the United States stands as a bar against the conviction 
of any individual in an American court by means of a 
coerced confession. There have been, and are now, 
certain foreign nations with governments dedicated to 
an opposite policy:  governments which convict 
individuals with testimony obtained by police 
organizations possessed of an unrestrained power to 
seize persons suspected of crimes against the state, hold 
them in secret custody, and wring from them 
confessions by physical or mental torture. So long as the 
Constitution remains the basic law of our Republic, 
America will not have that kind of government.142 
While powerful in its language and holding, Ashcraft has carried 
relatively limited precedential value.  There is rarely nonstop 
questioning conducted by teams of investigators over more than one full 
day in which a suspect is not given any time for rest.  Once the 
prosecution at issue moves away from such an extreme situation, it 
becomes problematic for courts to determine the reach of the 
                                                 
142 Id. at 149–55. 
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voluntariness test in terms of the duration of the questioning process.143  
Some courts conclude that a lengthy interrogation period, by itself, may 
be enough to cause the resulting confession to be invalid.144  Other 
judges feel that time itself is not necessarily the determinative factor.145  
Instead, they look to other considerations to decide whether the 
confession is voluntary.  Such considerations include the atmosphere 
surrounding the interrogation,146 the number and duration of breaks 
during the process,147 and the purpose for the questioning.148 
At the conclusion of a review of these cases, it is striking how little 
guidance lawyers, judges, and law enforcement officers have in terms of 
the allowable time for police questioning.  The experience in one state 
over a one-year period illustrates the point.  Within a period of thirteen 
months, three New York courts scrutinized extended interrogations and 
reached quite different results.  In one case, the suspect was questioned 
                                                 
143 In a case in which the defendant complained about an interrogation period of a little 
more than two hours, the court in People v. DeLisle discussed the necessary considerations: 
In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the circumstances 
which must be considered include, but are not limited to, the length 
and conditions of the detention, the physical and mental state of the 
defendant, the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the 
defendant, the nature of any inducement offered, the conduct of the 
police, and the adequacy and frequency of the advice of rights. 
455 N.W.2d 401, 403–04 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).  The confession  was determined to be 
coerced, with the court focusing on the length of the interrogation, the defendant’s 
emotional state, his lack of experience with the criminal justice system, and his limited 
education. 
144 See, e.g., Pardue v. State, 695 So. 2d 199, 205 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (addressing a 
series of interrogations that took place over a seventy-hour period); Smith v. Duckworth, 
910 F.2d 1492, 1496 (7th Cir. 1990) (considering a situation where the total time of 
questioning was nine hours); State v. Johnston, 580 N.E.2d 1162, 1167 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) 
(analyzing an interrogation that lasted eight and one-half hours). 
145 William v. Nye, 869 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D. Kan. 1994), aff’d, 83 F.3d 434 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(questioning of nineteen hours); State v. Munoz, 972 P.2d 847, 853 (N.M. 1998) (questioning 
less than two hours); Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) 
(interrogating for eight hours). 
146 See, e.g., Gonzales v. State, 807 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. App. 1991) (“Although 
appellant’s interview here lasted four and one-half hours, officers testified he was free to 
leave at anytime, had he asked for something they would have tried to oblige him, and he 
was not threatened in any way.”).  See generally State v. Harris, 105 P.3d 1258 (Kan. 2005). 
147 See, e.g., People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 994 (Cal. 1992) (“The 12-hour period . . . was not 
one of continuous interrogation.  The actual interrogation, which was divided into five 
sessions, comprised only about eight hours.  The breaks between sessions were not of 
insignificant duration.”).  See generally Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2003); State v. 
Blackman, 875 S.W.2d 122, 135–36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
148 Williams v. State, 991 S.W.2d 565, 574 (Ark. 1999) (allowing a thirteen hour 
interrogation process, for the “focus of the officers was on finding [the victim], who at the 
time of the interview was still missing and presumed alive”). 
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for ten hours.  The court allowed the process, remarking that there “was 
no evidence that the police officers threatened or pressured the 
defendant. . . .  At all times, he indicated his willingness to talk.”149  A 
similar ruling was issued in a case in which the defendant was 
interviewed for nine hours and the court stated that the defendant had 
been given the Miranda warnings, “was not subjected to continuous 
interrogation, and he was not denied sleep or food when requested.”150  
If those two cases reflect the New York law on point, it is difficult to 
explain the third case, where the resulting confession was found to be 
coerced.151  The interrogation in the third case took place during a 
twenty-three hour incarceration, but there was no indication of how long 
the actual questioning took.  For the court, it was “noteworthy that the 
defendant was not offered anything of substance to eat until eighteen 
hours after his arrest.”152  All three courts offered the somewhat less than 
helpful observation that the decision as to whether a confession has been 
coerced “is to be determined from the perspective of the defendant.”153 
E. The Individual Defendant 
As noted in the previous section, courts look closely at the 
characteristics of the particular defendant to determine whether that 
person was truly coerced by the actions of the police.  The courts 
evaluate a wide range of traits in order to fairly “focuses on the 
particular individual rather than on a hypothetical reasonable person.”154  
A number of the more significant factors are described below. 
1. Age  
There is no prohibition against the interrogation of minors.  The 
confessions of even young teens have been routinely allowed.155  
                                                 
149 People v. Smith, 617 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
150 People v. Hayes, 633 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
151 People v. Johnson, 636 N.Y.S.2d 540, 546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 545. 
154 United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also State v. Pickar, 453 
N.W.2d 783, 787 (N.D. 1990) (“The proper inquiry is whether, given the characteristics and 
condition of the accused, the atmosphere surrounding the interrogation was coercive.”). 
155 See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 131 S.W.3d 22, 24 (Tex. App. 2003) (“Evidence of Martinez’s 
world experiences shows that he was more sophisticated than an average 15 year-old.”); In 
re V.M.D., 974 S.W.2d 332, 346 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding that the confession of twelve-year-
old in a capital case was voluntary); Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 712 (Ark. 1996) 
(considering a fact pattern where the defendant was “just thirty-seven days away from his 
eighteenth birthday”); Everetts v. United States, 627 A.2d 981 (D.C. App. 1993) (holding 
that a sixteen-year-old teen was allowed to give statement). 
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Nevertheless, it is clear that such confessions will be scrutinized carefully 
to determine the ability of the youth to make a voluntary statement. The 
leading case is Haley v. Ohio,156 where the United States Supreme Court 
appeared shocked at seeing a teenager questioned by teams of police 
officers for more than five hours.  The Court wrote: 
What transpired would make us pause for careful 
inquiry if a mature man were involved. And when, as 
here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us, 
special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 
15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He 
cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of 
maturity. That which would leave a man cold and 
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his 
early teens. This is the period of great instability which 
the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year old lad, 
questioned through the dead of night by relays of police, 
is a ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men possibly 
might stand the ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m. But we 
cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for 
the police in such a contest. He needs counsel and 
support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, 
then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest 
the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, 
may not crush him.157 
                                                 
156 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
157 Id. at 599–600; see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).  In Gallegos, the Court 
reasoned: 
The fact that petitioner was only 14 years old puts this case on the 
same footing as Haley v. Ohio, supra. There was here no evidence of 
prolonged questioning. But the five-day detention—during which time 
the boy’s mother unsuccessfully tried to see him and he was cut off 
from contact with any lawyer or adult advisor—gives the case an 
ominous cast. The prosecution says that the boy was advised of his 
right to counsel, but that he did not ask either for a lawyer or for his 
parents. But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is 
unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him when he is 
made accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a 
person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding 
of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and 
who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get 
the benefits of his constitutional rights. 
The prosecution says that the youth and immaturity of the petitioner 
and the five-day detention are irrelevant, because the basic ingredients 
of the confession came tumbling out as soon as he was arrested. But if 
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Fortunately, few modern cases approach reaching the egregious 
practices in Haley.  Still, many judges express special concern when the 
accused is a minor.158  In a federal case decided just last year, a sixteen-
year-old was interrogated for three hours in the middle of the night 
without an adult advising him.159  Although he had been arrested before, 
the court concentrated heavily on the defendant’s “relative youth” in 
finding his confession to be involuntarily given.160  Similarly, another 
opinion emphasized the youth of the defendant—eleven years old—in 
determining that the confession had not been freely given: 
Every factor weighed in our analysis militates against 
the conclusion that LaCresha’s statement was voluntary.  
At eleven years of age, . . . [s]he had no experience with 
the criminal justice system, had been held in the custody 
of the State for three days, was unaccompanied by any 
parent, guardian, attorney, or other friendly adult, and 
was found to have below-normal intelligence by the 
court-appointed psychiatrist prior to her criminal trial, 
. . . .161 
2. The Defendant’s Health 
A defendant’s health is not often viewed as a factor that indicates 
that the confession was voluntary.  It is rare to see the reasoning that the 
confession was voluntary because the “defendant was in robust health,” 
or “the accused was viewed as cured of his mental illness.”162  Instead, 
                                                                                                             
we took that position, it would, with all deference, be in callous 
disregard of this boy’s constitutional rights. He cannot be compared 
with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the 
consequences of his admissions. 
370 U.S. at 53–54. 
158 As they should, based on the empirical evidence that has been assembled.  See infra 
note 184. 
159 Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2004). 
160 Id. at 1015. 
161 Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 288 (5th Cir. 2005); see also State v. Ellvanger, 453 
N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1990).  In Ellvanger, the court stated: 
An intoxicated fifteen-year-old boy who may or may not have been 
given his Miranda warnings was repeatedly interrogated by officers in 
early morning hours; he had had little sleep in the preceding 24 hours; 
he was experiencing the shock of the death of a friend and the 
wounding of his father; he was not represented by a parent, guardian, 
or custodian; he was denied his right to counsel . . . . 
453 N.W.2d at 815. 
162 But see State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1995) (emphasizing that the 
defendant “was both physically and mentally fit”). 
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the matter arises—with some regularity—when serious questions are 
raised as to concerns about the defendant’s physical or mental health in 
connection with the interrogation process.  The questions normally occur 
in three factual settings. 
The first setting is the situation in which the defendant is physically 
ailing and is either hospitalized or bedridden.  In such cases, the courts 
may allow the confession, but the conditions will be rigorously 
scrutinized.163  The second setting involves evidence that the defendant 
made an incriminating statement at a time when she was under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs.  Judges appear to have little tolerance in 
this setting and regularly allow confessions even when the suspect was 
substantially under the influence.164  It will likely take an unusual 
situation before judges are willing to find a confession in such a case to 
be involuntary.165 
The third setting is the most problematic because it involves 
defendants who suffer from serious mental illness.  Here, mere 
allegations of such illness will not suffice.  Instead, courts demand that 
the defendant show that he suffers from such a disorder and 
demonstrate that the disease affected the defendant’s ability to 
understand the rights explained to him and to voluntarily give a 
statement.  As explained recently by the Court of Criminal Appeals of 
Texas, evidence of a mental disorder is relevant in the voluntariness 
analysis.  The relevance of the disorder depends on the fulfillment of two 
criteria: 
                                                 
163 In State v. Vincik, 398 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Iowa 1987), the confession was invalidated 
with the court looking carefully at the defendant’s condition.  “We cannot divorce Vincik’s 
infirm mental and physical condition from the police officers’ actions here.  Vincik did not 
walk up to these two officers and offer to talk about a crime; he was arrested at the hospital 
and hauled to the . . . police station for interrogation.”  Id. 
164 See State v. Rivera, 733 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Ariz. 1987) (“The fact that defendant may still 
have been intoxicated at the time of his confession does not necessarily make the statement 
involuntary and thus inadmissible.”); State v. Barczak, 562 A.2d 140, 145 (Me. 1989)  (“[The 
issue is whether] despite the degree of intoxication he is aware and capable of 
comprehending and communicating with coherence and rationality.” (quoting State v. 
Finson, 447 A.2d 788, 792 (N.J. 1982))); Coon v. Weber, 644 N.W.2d 638, 645 (S.D. 2002) 
(“[T]he test for undue influence is whether the defendant can still relate the events of the 
time in question and his role in them.”).  But see Allan v. State, 38 P.3d 175, 178 (Nev. 2002) 
(rejecting the confession of the defendant—under the influence of methamphetamine—
who was subject to police questioning using “forms of psychological pressure”).  Contra 
Floyd v. State, 42 P.3d 249, 260 (Nev. 2002) (accepting the argument that the defendant was 
not in any sort of physical discomfort, and was only “somewhat intoxicated”). 
165 See generally State v. Young, 469 So. 2d 1014 (La. App. 1985). 
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The first concerns the existence of proof . . . illustrating 
that the mental condition . . . was reasonably capable of 
having such an affect on appellant’s mind so as to 
render the confession involuntary. . . .  The second 
concerns the existence of proof illustrating that the 
condition impaired the accused at the time he 
confessed.166 
The actual number of reported decisions in which a confession is 
found to be involuntary because of the suspect’s mental illness is 
small.167  Such decisions are made, but they are relatively rare.168 
3.  Intelligence Quotient (“I.Q.”) 
The impact of low I.Q. scores on the voluntariness test is especially 
troubling.169  It is disturbing because such scores may signal an inability 
of the suspect to understand the proceedings or lead to an individual 
being easily swayed into responding to what might otherwise appear to 
be non-coercive law enforcement practices.  Yet, the courts are clear that 
a low score alone is not sufficient to find a confession to be involuntary: 
[D]iminished mental or intellectual capacity does not of 
itself vitiate the ability to make a knowing and 
                                                 
166 Darnes v. State, 118 S.W.3d 916, 921 (Tex. App. 2003).  For an interesting discussion of 
the need for expert testimony when a defendant argues that someone with a particular 
“psychological profile sometimes makes statements that appear to be voluntary but that 
are in fact the product of suggestion,” see State v. Romero, 81 P.3d 714, 723 (Or. Ct. App. 
2003).  See generally Claudio Salas, Note, The Case for Excluding the Criminal Confessions of the 
Mentally Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243 (2004). 
167 See Young, 469 So. 2d at 1014; Darnes, 118 S.W.3d 916.  See generally State v. Blank, 804 
So. 2d 132, 140 (La. App. 2001) (addressing diminished mental capacity); State v. Halcomb, 
510 N.W.2d 344, 350 (Neb. App. 1993) (considering multiple personality disorder). 
168 Wilson v. Lawrence Country, 260 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 2001), provides a good 
illustration of the unusual prosecution.  There the criminal defendant appeared to have 
serious mental problems, and some authorities thought “he had difficulty distinguishing 
between fantasy and reality.”  Id. at 952.  The police intensely interrogated him and he 
made incriminating comments.  Id.  The Government argued that the confession was 
voluntary because the deceptive techniques utilized were no different from what had been 
affirmed in earlier cases (lies about evidence against him, threats as to imminent arrest, 
etc.).  Id. at 953.  The court categorically rejected this position, for here the “confessor 
. . . was mentally handicapped.”  Id.  Moreover, the fact that the defendant was advised of 
his rights did not move the court for he was “unlikely to understand them because of his 
low intelligence.”  Id. at 953. 
169 Michael J. O’Connell, Miranda Comprehension in Adults with Mental Retardation and the 
Effects of Feedback Style on Suggestibility, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 359, 359–69 (2005). 
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intelligent waiver of constitutional rights and a free and 
voluntary confession.170 
[A] subnormal mental capacity . . . does not, however, 
standing alone, render an in-custody statement 
incompetent if it is in all other respects voluntary and 
understandingly made.171 
[M]ental deficiencies of a defendant, by themselves, are 
not sufficient to render a confession involuntary.  To 
establish that his confession was involuntary, petitioner 
must also establish police coercion.172 
One factor that is often used to “balance out” the low intellectual 
ability of the accused is her experience with the criminal justice system.  
Such experience is thought to establish “some degree of familiarity with 
the criminal justice system.”173  Also, it may indicate that the individual 
is “better able to communicate in this field than most others,”174 and 
“would have aided him in understanding Miranda warnings.”175  Thus, it 
is not at all surprising that many courts have admitted confessions even 
in cases in which defendants possessed extremely low intelligence as 
indicated by sub-normal I.Q. scores.  The key for these courts is a 
conclusion that the experienced defendant—in spite of low intelligence—
is able to understand the proceedings, rationally consider the rights 
discussed, and freely choose to speak.176  This conclusion is especially 
significant if coupled with police tactics that are less than extreme.177 
                                                 
170 State v. Lavalais, 685 So. 2d 1048, 1054 (La. 1996) (allowing a statement where the 
defendant’s I.Q. score was seventy-seven). 
171 State v. Mahatha, 578 S.E.2d 617, 624 (N.C. App. 2003) (quoting State v. Fincher, 305 
S.E.2d 685, 690 (N.C. 1983) (finding a confession voluntary despite an I.Q. score of sixty-
two)). 
172 Moore v. Dugger, 856 F.2d 129, 131–32 (11th Cir. 1988) (allowing incriminating 
comments where the defendant’s I.Q. score was sixty-two).  The judges relied heavily on 
Colorado v. Connelly in finding that no improper police action took place.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 38–49.  See generally Rogers v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Ky. 
2002). 
173 Rankin v. State, 1 S.W.3d 14, 18 (Ark. 1999). 
174 People v. Travis, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1144 (Ill. App. 1988). 
175 Commonwealth v. St. Peter, 722 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Mass. App. 2000). 
176 See, e.g., State v. Cook, 67 S.W.3d 718 (Mo. App. 2002); Briones v. State, No. 13-01-152-
CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7305 (Tex. App. Aug. 27, 2003); Franks v. State, 90 S.W.3d 771 
(Tex. App. 2002).  See generally Roberts v. State, 102 S.W.3d 482 (Ark. 2003); State v. 
Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1997). 
177 See, e.g., People v. Melock, 599 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Ill. 1992); State v. Lynch, 787 N.E.2d 
1185, 1199 (Ohio 2003). 
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Again, unfortunately there exists a glaring lack of consistency in this 
area.  Many courts oppose admitting statements of individuals with sub-
normal intelligence.  Three cases from across the country illustrate this 
point.  A defendant’s murder conviction was reversed in State v. 
Rettenberger.178  The Utah Supreme Court found that because of the 
defendant’s “below-average I.Q. . . . he ‘was more susceptible to stress 
and coercion than the average person.’”179  The West Virginia Supreme 
Court, in State v. Lopez,180 set aside a conviction for felony-murder when 
the evidence showed that the accused had difficulty with the English 
language and “had the mental capacity of a five-year old, that he had 
borderline mental functioning, and that he thought only in concrete 
terms . . . [and] was unable to understand abstract concepts such as the 
right to silence.”181  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reached a similar 
result in State v. Cumber.182  The Wisconsin court laid out the evidence 
dealing with defendant’s capabilities: 
The officer acknowledged that Cumber had difficulty 
keeping his mind on a particular subject for any length 
of time.  He testified that Cumber was confused and 
upset, crying and contradicting himself several times 
during the interrogation and asking for help. . . .  
Cumber’s own testimony . . . revealed pronounced 
difficulty in reading.  His several attempts to read from 
his statement while on the stand uniformly lapsed into 
extreme confusion and nonsensical sentences.183 
It is not surprising that the courts are not in full agreement about the 
application of the voluntariness test to this fact pattern involving sub-
normal intelligence.  However, what is extremely problematic is that 
there is considerable relevant empirical evidence that should impact the 
decision making process, but such evidence is essentially ignored by 
many judges on both sides of the debate.184 
                                                 
178 984 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1999). 
179 Id. at 1019. 
180 476 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1996). 
181 Id. at 235. 
182 387 N.W.2d 291 (Wis. App. 1986). 
183 Id. at 294. 
184 As noted in one recent article:  “Studies and surveys have found that both minors and 
the mentally impaired are more likely to make false confessions, in part because they are 
more vulnerable to suggestion.”  Maura Dolan &  Evelyn Larrubia, Telling Police What They 
Want to Hear, Even if It’s False, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at 1, available at http://www. 
latimes.com/news/local/la-me-confess30oct30,0,7515039,print.story?coll=la-. 
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I do not argue that judges are incapable of carefully reviewing such 
information; after all, that is precisely what the United States Supreme 
Court did in determining that mentally retarded defendants cannot be 
sentenced to death.185  The Supreme Court’s analysis was thoughtful and 
respectful of the relevant scientific research in the field.186  Rather, one is 
struck by how little weight is placed on the empirical evidence that 
discusses the ability of persons with sub-average intelligence to 
understand the proceedings187 or resist heavy police activity and freely 
choose to make a statement.188 While several commentators have 
attempted to come to grips with such work,189 judges do not often make 
the effort.  Instead, even in cases of defendants with very low I.Q. scores, 
judicial opinions spend little time on such scores and make mere 
references to the fact that the defendant was advised of his rights190 or 
that the person had the ability to understand the rights and to confess 
voluntarily.191 
                                                 
185 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
186 See also Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535 (2003) 
(looking to low I.Q. scores as being the basis for jurors to decline to sentence a convicted 
capital defendant to the death penalty); In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 352 (Cal. 2005) 
(California Supreme Court refused to identify any I.Q. score as indicating mental 
retardation in the capital sentencing context). 
187 Researchers in England: 
[F]ound that many people with learning disabilities did not 
understand that they had a right to legal advice and/or a right to have 
someone informed of the whereabouts, even when the Notice [of 
rights, similar to Miranda warnings] was read out to them . . . [and 
even after the Notice was simplified] 68% of the sentences were fully 
understood by people in the normal range for ability, while people 
with intellectual disabilities understood only 11% of sentences. 
G. Murphy & I.C. Clare, People with Learning Disabilities as Offenders or Alleged Offenders in 
the UK Criminal Justice System, 91 J. ROYAL SOC. MED. 178, 180 (1998).  The U.S. studies are 
similar.  See Solomon M. Fulero & Caroline Everington, Assessing the Capacity of Persons with 
Mental Retardation to Waive Miranda Rights:  A Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28 L. & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 53 (2004). 
188 “People of limited intelligence are generally more suggestible than those of superior 
cognitive abilities.”  Gisli Gudjonsson, Theoretical and Empirical Aspects of Interrogative 
Suggestibility in SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY 141 (Gheorghiu et al. eds., 1989); see also 
Fulero & Everington, supra note 187.  This finding is also made with young suspects.  
Fulero & Everington, supra note 187. 
189 The leading piece is an excellent analysis.  Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without 
Meaning:  The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495 
(2002). 
190 The court in White v. State recognized that the defendant, with an I.Q. score of sixty-
four, was mildly retarded, but allowed his statement for he was advised of his rights and 
he never requested an attorney.  465 S.E.2d 277 (Ga. 1996). 
191 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wallen, 619 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Mass. App. 1993), where the 
confession was found to be voluntary.  The judges explained their decision: 
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4. Impact of Videotaping 
In the past decade, many police departments throughout the United 
States have begun to videotape the interrogation process and resulting 
confessions of suspects in custody.192  Some do it as a matter of policy; 
others are directed to do so by judicial opinions.193  Also, just two years 
ago, Illinois became the first state in the nation to enact a statute 
requiring videotaping.194  Because these developments are so recent, the 
impact of this new procedure in reported decisions and conviction 
appeals are only now available. 
                                                                                                             
Nothing appears from the record to indicate that the defendant was 
unable to understand any of the procedures.  While the judge found 
that the defendant has an I.Q. between sixty and seventy, attained only 
third or fourth grade reading and writing levels, and is able to 
recognize few words of more than three syllables, he also found he 
could read newspapers and write letters. 
Id. 
192 The United Kingdom has mandated such videotaping for a number of years.  See John 
Baldwin, Police Interview Techniques:  Establishing Truth or Proof, 33 BRIT. J. CRIM. 325 (1993) 
(discussing the practices there and in Australia); Slobogin, supra note 9 (arguing in favor of 
a constitutional requirement of taping in the United States); Wayne Westling & Vicki Waye, 
Videotaping Police Interrogations:  Lessons from Australia, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 493 (1998).  
Concerns as to the impact of videotaped statements are laid out in G. Daniel Lassiter et al., 
Accountability and the Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped Confessions, in ANALYSES OF 
SOCIAL ISSUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 53–70 (2001). 
193 See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (requiring recording under the 
state constitution); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994) (mandating taping under 
its supervisory power).  In Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court—looking to its supervisory power regarding evidence at trials—decided that 
if a confession was not videotaped, the jury could be instructed that the statement was to 
be evaluated with “particular caution.”  813 N.E.2d 5 (Mass. 2004).  A similar result was 
reached in State v. Jerrell, 699 N.W.2d 110 (Wis. 2005), but it was limited to juveniles. 
194 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.2 provides: 
(b) An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as 
a result of a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of 
detention shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the 
accused in any criminal proceeding . . . unless: 
(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation; 
and 
(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally 
altered. 
(c) Every electronic recording required under this Section must be 
preserved until such time as . . . all . . . appeals are exhausted . . . 
(d) If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation in violation of this 
Section, then any statements made by the defendant during or 
following that non-recorded custodial interrogation. . . are presumed 
to be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding against the defendant 
except for the purposes of impeachment. 
Id. 
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The impact looks as if it will be substantial in two principal ways.  
First, it will give judges a good look at the process to determine whether 
improper techniques were employed during questioning.  Judges can 
determine for themselves that the process was not harsh and involved no 
mistreatment195 or that inappropriate assurances or promises were made 
to the suspect during the custodial period.196  Viewing a videotaped 
interrogation is also quite helpful in determining the individual suspect’s 
condition.  Thus, judges are more able to conclude with some degree of 
certainty that the accused either understood her rights and freely 
spoke197 or was coerced into talking with the police.198  At this point the 
number of reported cases exploring the role of videotaped interrogations 
is limited, but that number is very likely to increase substantially over 
the next several years. 
5.  Miranda Warnings  
Many commentators have asserted that Miranda is not the law 
enforcement straightjacket that its critics claim.199  Indeed, this Article 
and others have made the argument that the Miranda requirements are 
an extremely important and positive tool for the police.  That is, if 
officers who are interrogating suspects in their custody carefully follow 
the mandate of  Miranda and clearly advise the suspects of their rights to 
silence and a lawyer, few Fifth Amendment problems will follow in 
admitting confessions. 
The point extends even further.  The same notion is true with respect 
to the impact of the warnings in cases in which the defense’s claim of 
inadmissibility rests on due process rather than privilege against self-
incrimination.  Courts have consistently found that the giving of Miranda 
warnings is a relevant and significant factor in the totality-of-
circumstances analysis under the Due Process Clause.200  Additionally, in 
                                                 
195 State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866 (Ohio 1998). 
196 State v. Baston, 928 P.2d 79 (Kan. 1996). 
197 See Villa v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1272, 1275 (Ind. App. 1999); State v. Lamark, 584 So. 2d 
686 (La. App. 1991); People v. Haywood, 530 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. App. 1995). 
198 One of the most publicized cases involved Maryland defendant Richard Gater.  The 
basic facts of the case are laid out in the introductory section above.  See Casteneda, supra 
note 2. 
199 See, e.g., Cloud et al., supra note 189; Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Discard 
Miranda, 112 YALE L.J. 447 (2002); Paul Marcus, A Return to the `Bright Line’ Rule of 
Miranda, 35 WM. & MARY L.J. 93 (1993).  For an excellent overview of the area, see WELSH S. 
WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS:  POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER 
DICKERSON (Univ. of Mich. Press 2001). 
200 See, e.g., Lyons v. Luebbers, 403 F.3d 585, 596–97 (8th Cir. 2005); Roman v. State, 475 
So. 2d 1228, 1232 (Fla. 1985); State v. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d 226, 229 (N.D. 1991); Jackson v. 
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that analysis, the Miranda warnings are given heavy weight.  Many cases 
can be found throughout the nation—both federal and state—in which 
confessions are held to be voluntary, with courts relying strongly on the 
fact that the suspects were given Miranda warnings and appeared to 
understand their constitutional rights.201 
Once again, consistent statements of the law cannot be expected.  
Just as some courts look to the Miranda warnings to find voluntary 
statements, other courts discuss the warnings to conclude that improper 
coercion took place.  This conclusion is usually reached where either the 
warnings were not given202 or the warnings were given and then the 
officers disregarded the wishes of the suspect that she be given a lawyer 
or not be interrogated.203  In the latter situation, the courts are rather 
unforgiving of continual police questioning and will often find a 
confession to be involuntary, wholly apart from any Fifth Amendment 
considerations.204 
                                                                                                             
Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 2004).  Of course, the giving of the warnings is no 
guarantee that a later statement will be found to be voluntary, as we shall see, for the 
“police [may then still use] fear, coercion, hope of reward, or some other improper 
inducement.”   State v. Cooper, 949 P.2d 660, 665 (N.M. 1997); see also Taillon, 470 N.W.2d 
226. 
201 The cases here are voluminous.  See United States v. Gillaum, 355 F.3d 982, 990 (7th 
Cir. 2004); Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1310–11 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jones, 
32 F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir. 1994); Bisbee v. State, 17 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Ark. 2000); People v. 
Mays, 531 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ill. App. 1988); State v. Franklin, 803 So. 2d 1057, 1067 (La. 
App. 2001); Alexander v. State, 610 So. 2d 320, 327 (Miss. 1992); Licon v. State, 99 S.W.3d 
918, 925 (Tex. App. 2003). 
202 One court explained: 
[T]he officers’ failure to administer Miranda warnings weighs against a 
finding of voluntariness.  As both parties point out, “[v]oluntariness 
and Miranda are two separate inquiries.”  This does not, however, 
make a Miranda violation irrelevant to the issue of voluntariness.  To 
the contrary, in considering whether a person’s will was overborne 
sufficiently to render a confession involuntary, the court should 
consider whether the accused was advised of his or her constitutional 
rights.  Although a failure to give Miranda warnings is not 
determinative of voluntariness, the lack of warnings gives “added 
weight” to other circumstances that make a confession involuntary. 
State v. Pettit, 979 P.2d 5, 9 (Ariz. App. 1998).  For a heated exchange on the significance of 
the warnings, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in State v. Hoppe, 661 N.W.2d 
407 (Wis. 2003). 
203 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 609 A.2d 1112 (D.C. App. 1992); Allan v. State, 38 
P.3d 175, 178 (Nev. 2002). 
204 The language of the court in People v. Neal, 72 P.3d 280, 291 (Cal. 2003), is particularly 
harsh, for the justices there spoke of the police officer’s “misconduct . . . as ‘blatant 
disregard’ of Miranda [which] is to understate its blameworthiness . . . .”  Id. 
Marcus: It's Not Just About Miranda:  Determining the Voluntariness of Co
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
638 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
IV.  APPLYING THE VOLUNTARINESS PRINCIPLE 
The test today for voluntariness remains what it has been for more 
than half a century:  Judges “look at the totality of the circumstances of 
the case in determining whether the confession was voluntary.”205  The 
question in each case is whether the police action during the 
interrogation “overb[ore] a suspect’s will.”206  Thus, one must ask 
whether “the confessor did not make the decision to confess of his own 
free will.”207  The determination is remarkably fact specific, with courts 
looking at many factors in resolving claims under the Due Process 
Clause.208  In order for the reader to have a full appreciation of how 
difficult it would be to predict the result in a particular case209 and to see 
the extremely limited precedential value of any judicial opinion in this 
area,210 Part IV.A examines several illustrative cases. 
A. The Voluntary Confession 
The rule as applied in practice certainly is far from clear.  For 
instance, in one case the defendant was beaten by the police at the station 
and he confessed.211  His testimony—not contradicted on the record—
                                                 
205 State v. Barden, 572 S.E.2d 108, 124 (N.C. 2002).  See generally Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 
1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005); Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 928–29 (6th Cir. 2004). 
206 Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1988). 
207 Hinton v. Snyder, 203 F. Supp. 2d 934, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
208 The national record for the number of factors to be considered appears to go to the 
Michigan state courts, which may, in one prosecution, rely upon fifteen to twenty such 
items.  See, e.g., People v. Wells, 605 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (mentioning the 
following:  the age, education, and intelligence of the accused; his previous experience with 
the police; the repeated nature and duration of the interrogation; the giving of Miranda 
warnings; any unnecessary delay in bringing the accused before a magistrate; whether the 
defendant was injured, intoxicated, or drugged; whether he was in ill health; whether the 
accused was given food, sleep, or necessary medical attention; and whether he was abused 
or threatened with abuse).  Other noteworthy contenders include Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 
992, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2004) (eight factors); United States v. Garot, 801 F.2d 1241, 1245 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (seven factors); State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 1989) (twelve factors); 
and State v. Barden, 572 S.E.2d at 124–25 (N.C. 2002) (nine factors).  See generally United 
States v. Jones, 359 F.3d 921, 923–24 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 
1024, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2003). 
209 The one real exception here, as noted earlier, is the use of force by officers against the 
suspect.  See United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[C]onfessions 
accompanied by physical violence wrought by the police have been considered per se 
inadmissible.”); United States ex rel Hinton v. Snyder, 203 F. Supp. 2d 934, 941 (W.D. Ill. 
2002) (“It is axiomatic that a confession extracted with violence or the threat of violence is 
involuntary.”). 
210 As the judges in Haswood properly wrote:  “The totality of circumstances contains no 
‘talismanic definition’ of voluntariness.  Courts instead often consider [many] factors . . . .”  
350 F.3d at 1027. 
211 Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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was that the officers “kicked, hit, and knocked [him] to the ground, 
punched and beat[] [him] with a nightstick, raised [him] off the floor by 
elevating his handcuffed arms behind him, and [pulled] his hair.”212  
Thereafter, he was moved to a second police station where he confessed 
again.  The issue in the case was whether the second statement was 
voluntary.  The evidence showed that the defendant had remained in 
custody throughout the process, did not speak with a lawyer, and did 
not initiate the conversation that led to the later confession.  
Nevertheless, the court found the second statement to be voluntary 
because the second group of officers had not mistreated the accused, six 
hours had passed between the two confessions, and the later 
interrogation was conducted by different officers in a different police 
station.  As the court stated:  “Any threat of physical mistreatment had 
faded considerably in the interim; [defendant] must have recognized the 
difference between [the two police stations] in terms of atmosphere and 
the treatment accorded him by his interrogators.”213 
In other cases, voluntariness is found with courts relying heavily on 
the “fortitude” of the defendant in demanding her rights.  In one case, 
the demand was to see a search warrant,214 and in another case it was a 
refusal to sign a written confession after an oral statement had been 
made.215  In such instances, the judges looked at a variety of 
circumstances in reaching their conclusions.216  For many judges, 
                                                 
212 Id. at 1047. 
213 Id. at 1051.  The court took into account the defendant’s “personal characteristics, 
including his age, education, intelligence and prior experience with the police, in 
determining whether he voluntarily tendered the [second] confession.”  Id. at 1052.  Also, 
see State v. Hall, 369 S.E.2d 701, 704 (W. Va. 1988), where the confession was allowed even 
though the defendant had, at the start, been beaten or kicked by the officers.  The key for 
the judges in that case was that thirteen days had passed between the beating and the 
confession.  This lag was viewed as “sufficient to dissipate the taint of coercion.”  Id. at 705. 
214 United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1333 (10th Cir. 1999). 
215 People v. Williams, 627 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
216 The factors are so specific to the particular prosecution that it is difficult to generalize 
as to what will influence judges.  United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 694 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(analyzing a situation where a troubled defendant was twenty-four years old and there was 
no evidence of a diminished mental capacity); McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 454, 458 (6th Cir. 
1988) (considering that weapons were shown but not pointed at the suspect); Lukehart v. 
State, 776 So. 2d  906, 920 (Fla. 2000) (holding that sympathy elicited based on the 
defendant’s religious beliefs did not “directly result” in the confession); State v. 
Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 110 (N.J. 1999) (allowing a statement where the suspect slept 
only a few hours, but questioning was not “around the clock or continuous” and he was 
allowed to go home briefly before being questioned again); State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 
726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (considering a case where the accused was told by police “‘what 
had to be’ in her statement,” which was not the sort of action viewed as inherently 
coercive). 
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deciding factors can be the defendant’s background,217 the fact that she 
was alert and not sleep deprived,218 or that nothing about the accused’s 
“age, sex, race, education, or physical or mental condition made him 
susceptible to coercion.”219 
B. The Involuntary Confession 
Similar to the voluntary confessions, the legal principles applicable 
to an involuntary confession are far from certain.  In one case, the court 
looked to an astonishingly large number of factors in finding the 
confession coerced.220  The interrogation took sixteen hours, was 
conducted by a “serial team,” the accused was not given a break, the 
questions were “unabashedly leading,” the suspect was not permitted to 
rest despite his requests, the officers refused to honor his requests under 
Miranda, and the officers spoke to him about his history of blackouts as 
casting doubt on his story.221  With such a rich assortment of 
considerations, it appears impossible to suggest just what rule the case 
stands for under the Due Process Clause. 
Another recent case is similar.  In State v. Marshall,222 a Minnesota 
court struck down a confession, considering factors such as the failure to 
advise the suspect of her Miranda rights; the fact that she was confronted 
in her home by two officers, one of whom was armed; the officers’ 
discouraging of contact between the mother and her daughter; the 
suspect becoming so emotionally wrought during the interrogation that 
she stated that her “head [was] swimming”; the officers exploitation of 
her religious beliefs;223 and the defendant not being allowed to eat.224 
                                                 
217 State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 189, 197 (Conn. 1986). 
218 People v. Roybal, 55 P.3d 144, 147 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 
219 State v. Sabinash, 574 N.W.2d 827, 829 (N.D. 1998).  In State v. Harris, the defendant 
was held for seven hours while he was shackled to the floor and prevented from using the 
telephone.  105 P.3d 1258 (Kan. 2005).  The court found the later confession to be voluntary 
based upon a totality of circumstances analysis, especially focusing on the fact that the 
defendant was twenty-four years old and had other juvenile felony convictions.  Id. at 1264. 
220 State v. Sawyer, 561 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1990). 
221 Id. at 290–91. 
222 642 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
223 For two Mississippi prosecutions using this religious reliance, see Carley v. State, 739 
So. 2d 1046, 1053 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (“We are particularly troubled by the invocation of 
the deity, discussion of Heaven and Hell, and the promise that ‘the truth sets you free’ to 
induce a confession.”), and Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d 1015, 1033 (Miss. 1992).  See also 
Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 920 (Fla. 2000). 
224 Marshall, 642 N.W.2d at 56.  The court was sympathetic with the needs of the police, 
but still found a due process violation: 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 [2006], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/4
2006] Voluntariness of Confessions 641 
Such decisions defy any sort of ready formula for determining the 
voluntariness of a confession.  There are simply too many factors with 
too narrow analyses to allow for any reasonable reliance by law 
enforcement officers, judges, and lawyers.  Also, of course, they are 
joined by many other cases that consider a wide assortment of factors in 
attempting to determine if a confession was improperly coerced.225  In 
short, commentators who have cast doubt on the jurisprudence in this 
important area appear correct.  As one thoughtful observer gently and 
generously put it: 
Because the totality-of-the-circumstances test permits the 
courts to weigh several factors together, it is not always 
possible to determine which factors caused a court to 
exclude or admit a confession, and courts rarely indicate 
the relative importance of the factors that they use.226 
This statement is unquestionably correct.  The problem, of course, is 
that the analysis is ultimately subjective, one which is fact specific to the 
particular prosecution and defendant, recognizing “that the amount of 
police pressure that is constitutional is not the same for each 
defendant.”227 
                                                                                                             
Police investigators face substantial obstacles in resolving an 
investigation of a death that occurred almost twenty years ago; 
confessions are one of the limited avenues available to them.  But 
incriminating statements produced by coercion are inherently 
untrustworthy and undermine fundamental concepts of due process. 
Id. at 56. 
225 Judges have emphasized several factors in this analysis.  See United States v. Perdue, 8 
F.3d 1455, 1466 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing force, either used or threatened); State v. 
Coombs, 704 A.2d 387, 392 (Me. 1998) (addressing lack of breaks during interrogation); 
State v. Mayes, 825 P.2d 1196, 1207 (Mont. 1992) (considering no sleep for the accused); 
Passama v. State, 735 P.2d 321, 323 (Nev. 1987) (analyzing prolonged questioning of the 
suspect); Marquez v. State, 890 P.2d 980, 986 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (applying promises of 
a deal to the analysis); State v. Cochran, 696 P.2d 1114, 1121 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (using 
trickery as to the meaning of Miranda warnings); State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1019 
(Utah 1999) (addressing the low I.Q. of the defendant).  However, even in these cases, 
several other significant factors were expressly relied upon by the courts. 
226 Cloud et al., supra note 189, at 528. 
227 State v. Hoppe, 661 N.W.2d 407, 415 (Wis. 2003).  In Taylor v. Maddox, the confession 
was found to be involuntary, with the court writing: 
[The defendant’s] relative youth, the time of night when he was 
questioned, the length of the interrogation, the absence of an attorney 
or parent, the fact that he “was given no food, offered no rest break, 
and may or many not have been given any water,” and the denial of 
his requests to speak with his mother. . . . 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The rule regarding voluntariness remains a vital and perplexing 
feature of the criminal justice system in the United States when 
considering the admissibility of confessions.  To be sure, the privilege 
against self-incrimination in Miranda applies to many cases and disposes 
of a good number of them.  However, literally thousands of prosecutions 
can be found throughout the country where serious due process 
challenges are raised so that the government has to offer substantial 
evidence to rebut the claim of constitutional violations.228  The legal test 
truly does not vary much between jurisdictions.  Prosecutors everywhere 
must show that in making the confession, the criminal defendant made a 
“free and unconstrained choice”229 and that the confession was “the 
product of a rational intellect and free will and not the result of physical 
abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that 
have overcome the defendant’s free will.”230 
                                                                                                             
366 F.3d 992, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004).  See generally United States v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059 (10th 
Cir. 2006); Edwards v. State, 842 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Lam v. Kelchner, 
304 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 2002); Martin v. State, 686 A.2d 1130, 1143 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1996); State v. Knight, 849 A.2d 209, 219 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
228 The federal courts use a preponderance of the evidence standard as set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).  Many states follow this standard.  
See State v. Lacy, 929 P.2d 1288 (Ariz. 1996); Sliney v. State, 699 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1997); 
Aguilar v. State, 751 P.2d 178 (N.M. 1988); State v. Hoehne, 989 P.2d 469 (Or. Ct. App. 
1999); Hernandez v. State, 952 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210 
(Wash. 1996); State v. Wilson, 439 S.E.2d 448 (W. Va. 1993); Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41 
(Wyo. 1999).  Other states use a reasonable doubt test.  See Henry v. State, 738 N.E.2d 663 
(Ind. 2000); State v. Leonard, 605 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 1992); State v. McCarthy, 819 A.2d 
335 (Me. 2003); Commonwealth v. Judge, 650 N.E.2d 1242 (Mass. 1995); Moody v. State, 841 
So. 2d 1067 (Miss. 2003); State v. Hammond, 742 A.2d 532 (N.H. 1999); People v. 
Williamson, 667 N.Y.S.2d 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); State v. Corder, 460 N.W.2d 733 (S.D. 
1990).  Rhode Island appears to require the prosecution to make the showing of 
voluntariness by clear and convincing evidence.  State v. Apalakis, 797 A.2d 440, 447 (R.I. 
2002). 
229 State v. Bowers, 661 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Iowa 2003); see also Steese v. State, 960 P.2d 321, 
327 (Nev. 1998). 
230 United States v. Abdullah, 294 F.3d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 2002).  For a less than wholly 
convinced view of this standard in practice, see Judge Posner’s opinion for the court in 
United States v. Rutledge: 
The courts in such cases retreat to the proposition that a confession, to 
be admissible, must be the product of a free choice . . . [but this] leads 
nowhere.  Taken seriously it would require the exclusion of virtually 
all fruits of custodial interrogation, since few choices to confess can be 
thought truly “free” when made by a person who is incarcerated and is 
being questioned by armed officers without the presence of counsel or 
anyone else to give him moral support.  The formula is not taken 
seriously. 
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Yet, the clarity of the test as stated is in sharp contrast to its 
application in practice.  The reality is that few criteria stand out as 
especially significant, and even fewer appellate decisions can be viewed 
as establishing noteworthy precedents.  The due process test offers 
almost no guidance for lawyers and judges.231 
This Article has considered thousands of opinions on confessions 
from the past two decades.  One necessarily comes away with a feeling 
of being unclean and tainted by government activities that are not 
honorable even given the environment needed for interrogations.  Many 
judges allow confessions into evidence in cases in which police 
interrogators lied and threatened defendants or played on the mental, 
emotional, or physical weaknesses of suspects.  While judges write that 
they do not condone such conduct232 and find such practices 
repugnant,233 reprehensible,234 or deplorable,235 some of those same 
judges have upheld the admission of such confessions that result from 
those practices after applying the totality of circumstances test.236 
                                                                                                             
900 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1996). 
231 This critical view is shared by other commentators.  Professor Welsh White wrote that 
“the due process test provides few safeguards against the admission of untrustworthy 
confessions.”  Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution:  Safeguards Against 
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 105, 117 (1997).  He explained 
further: 
Interrogators are not permitted to use overtly coercive tactics such as 
insisting on an answer after the suspect has indicated a desire to 
remain silent; moreover, they may not use direct or indirect threats of 
violence, nor interrogate suspects continuously for thirty-six hours.  
Interrogators are not prohibited, however, from questioning suspects 
for a considerable period and employing a wide array of interrogation 
tactics, including trickery, to induce a confession. 
Id.; see also Sherry F. Colb, Why the Supreme Court Should Overrule the Massiah Doctrine and 
Permit Miranda Alone to Govern Interrogations (2001), http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/ 
colb/20010509.html.  In Colb’s article, she stated: 
“[V]oluntariness” was the original standard for deciding whether a 
confession had been exacted in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  But 
it was an amorphous standard.  Courts found themselves bogged 
down in factual determinations about suspects’ free will in each case.  
It was difficult to predict in advance which confessions would become 
evidence, and which would be suppressed. 
Id. 
232 Luckhart v. State 736 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Ind. 2000). 
233 Ex parte Hill, 557 So. 2d 838, 842 (Ala. 1989). 
234 United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001). 
235 State v. Register, 476 S.E.2d 153, 158 (S.C. 1996). 
236 Two recent cases illustrate the point well.  In United States v. LeBrun, the interrogating 
officers “interrupted [the defendant] in a bullying manner and demonstrated a threatening 
kind of impatience with him” and seemingly promised him he would not be prosecuted if 
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I began by asking two questions:  (1) How important are the due 
process rules today now that we have lived for almost forty years with 
Miranda?, and (2) Have these principles improved at all in practice from 
the muddled mess found prior to the Chief Justice’s opinion there?  The 
strong belief I have formed is that the rules are most important and are 
widely applied in the twenty-first century, they are just as poorly and 
inconsistently applied as they were in the 1950s and 1960s.  In 
comparison, the imprecisely bright line rules of Miranda look very good. 
                                                                                                             
he confessed to spontaneously killing the victim.  363 F.3d 715, 727 (8th Cir. 2004) (Arnold, 
J., dissenting).  The confession was allowed into evidence.  The confession was also 
permitted in Knight v. State, though the officer gave the suspect “the impression that 
probation was a possibility, and that [the officer] could make things either difficult or easy 
for him by recommending bond.” 971 S.W.2d 272 (Ark. App. 1998) (Rogers, J., dissenting).  
In both cases, the majority looked to a multitude of factors in determining that no due 
process violation had occurred.  Cf. Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 A.2d 516 (Mass. 
2004) (disallowing a confession because the interrogating officers seemed to sympathize 
with the suspect, telling him that the crime was understandable and perhaps even 
justifiable).  The court reasoned that “[r]esearch suggests that such ‘minimization’ of the 
crime by an interrogator implies leniency if the suspect will adopt that minimized version 
of the crime, and that leniency can thereby be implicitly offered even if it is not expressly 
stated as a quid pro quo for the confession.”  Id. at 526. 
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